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Is international law law? In 2009, the American Society of International 
Law organized a panel at its annual meeting to discuss the question. Most of 
the panelists, however, began by expressing indignation that such a panel had 
even been convened. Andrew Guzman thought the question was a “futile” 
one;1 Thomas Franck was “surprised that we have gathered here again at the 
beginning of a new political era to ask this tired old question”;2 and José 
Alvarez was “appalled that we are still discussing this 1960’s chestnut of a 
question.”3 Instead, they agreed, the more interesting question—indeed, the 
proper organizing question of the field—is, “how well does international law 
do in its effort to influence state behavior.”4 
We understand this reaction, but we do not share it. The question of 
whether international law is law matters a great deal. Most fundamentally, it 
matters from the moral point of view. Law’s moral import follows from a basic 
truth accepted by all but hardcore anarchists: namely, that legal systems are 
morally valuable institutions.5 Thus, whether we ought to respect, support, or 
obey international law depends in part on whether it possesses those properties 
that make legal regimes worthy of our esteem and allegiance—that is, on 
whether it is “really” law (an implication, by the way, not lost on critics who 
deny its legality). But there is an additional—and, we shall see, deeply 
illuminating—reason why this jurisprudential question ought to be engaged. 
As we will show in this Article, responding to the critics who argue that 
international law is not law allows us to make substantial new progress in 
answering the very question international law scholars do care about: whether 
and how international law affects state behavior. 
The reason is simple. The principal objection made by critics of 
international law is that international law cannot be real law because it cannot 
matter in the way that real law must matter. In particular, they argue that 
 
1.  Andrew T. Guzman, Rethinking International Law as Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 155, 
155 (2009). 
2.  Thomas Franck, Remarks, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 161, 161 (2009). 
3.  José E. Alvarez, But Is It Law?, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 163, 163 (2009). 
4.  Guzman, supra note 1, at 156. 
5.  To say that the law is a morally valuable institution is to make a claim about its potential. 
The moral value of the law stems from its distinctive ability to solve problems that no other 
comparable social institutions are capable of solving. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY chs. 6, 
14 (2011). When a particular system does not solve these problems, exacerbates them, or 
creates new problems, it fails to realize its potential and correspondingly lacks moral value. 
In this respect, law is like marriage and education. While these social institutions are capable 
of realizing important moral goods, their failure to do so deprives their instantiations of 
value and may render them morally pernicious. 
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international law cannot matter in the way it must to be law because it lacks 
mechanisms of coercive enforcement. Anthony D’Amato describes this 
objection as follows: 
Many serious students of the law react with a sort of indulgence 
when they encounter the term “international law,” as if to say, “well, we 
know it isn’t really law, but we know that international lawyers and 
scholars have a vested professional interest in calling it ‘law.’” Or they 
may agree to talk about international law as if it were law, a sort of 
quasi-law or near-law. But it cannot be true law, they maintain, because 
it cannot be enforced: how do you enforce a rule of law against an 
entire nation, especially a superpower such as the United States or the 
Soviet Union?6  
On this objection, international law cannot be real law because real law 
must be capable of affecting behavior through the threat and exercise of 
physical coercion. Since international law lacks mechanisms of physically 
coercive enforcement, it cannot affect behavior in the right way and hence 
cannot be a real legal system. It follows that answering the skeptic who doubts 
that international law is law also answers the skeptic who doubts that 
international law matters. For in order to respond to the first skeptic, one must 
show that international law is capable of affecting behavior in the right way to 
be law. But once one shows that international law matters in the right way, one 
ipso facto shows that it matters! 
No doubt, one could try to answer the question of whether international 
law matters directly without engaging the central objection to international law 
as law. But there is a crucial advantage to addressing the former question via 
the latter. For examining whether international law is law first requires one to 
figure out all the ways in which legal systems must be capable of affecting 
behavior to be law. This inquiry opens up a fascinating range of new 
possibilities about how law might matter to its subjects. With the help of the 
fuller account that results, we will not only see that international law is capable 
of affecting state behavior in the right way to be law; more significantly, it is 
capable of affecting state behavior in ways that have previously eluded 
international law scholars. Though international law does not matter to states 
in the same way that much modern domestic law does, we will show that it 
matters to them nonetheless. International law has mechanisms of law 
enforcement and these mechanisms give states reason not to violate the law. 
 
6.  Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, 79 NW. U. L. REV 1293, 1293 (1985). 
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Jurisprudence, then, can be an invaluable tool for empirical investigations 
of legal phenomena, for the former aims to uncover logical space often 
neglected by the latter. Indeed, the temptation to overlook important areas of 
jurisprudential space when analyzing international law is especially strong. 
After all, the legal systems with which we are most familiar are domestic. In 
our culture, modern state regimes are the paradigm instances of law. The 
inclination to focus exclusively on the state and to understand all legal 
phenomena through this lens is thus completely understandable. But it is also, 
we argue, a grave mistake. 
In this Article, we show that critics of international law have succumbed to 
this temptation and have taken modern legal systems as their exclusive model 
for law. They have adopted what we call the “Modern State Conception” of 
law. The Modern State Conception maintains that regimes are legal systems 
only when they possess the distinctive capacities of the modern state; namely, 
they possess a monopoly over the use of force within a territory and use this 
monopoly to enforce their rules. In the domestic context, the monopoly is 
shared by a host of interlocking bureaucratic organizations that employ 
intimidation and violence as a method of enforcement, such as police, militia, 
prosecutorial agencies, and correctional institutions. In the Modern State 
Conception, then, law matters through the threat and exercise of violence by 
such organizations. Skepticism about international law naturally follows from 
this conception given that international law does not possess these bureaucratic 
institutions. Famously, it does not have its own army or police force. While 
international prosecutorial agencies and prisons have sprung up in recent 
years, nothing resembling the modern state’s enforcement apparatus exists or 
is likely to exist for the foreseeable future. If law must matter through the 
threat and exercise of physical coercion by an interlocking system of 
bureaucratic institutions, then international law cannot matter in the right way 
to be law. 
We argue that the concept of law that lies behind this critique of 
international law is seriously flawed because of its limited understanding of 
how rules must be capable of affecting behavior in order to count as law. Its 
failure stems not simply from the fact that the Modern State Conception insists 
that legal rules only affect behavior when they are enforced; more importantly, 
it falters by adopting an excessively narrow conception of law enforcement 
itself. The Modern State Conception errs by insisting that law may only be 
enforced in the same way that it is enforced in modern states. First, it demands 
that the law can matter only if it is enforced internally, i.e., by the regime itself. 
Second, it requires that law matter only if it is enforced violently, i.e., through 
the threat and exercise of physical force. 
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This narrow understanding of law enforcement ignores regimes that 
outsource enforcement to external parties. We argue that, contrary to the 
Modern State Conception, as long as some party is tasked with using coercion 
in order to ensure compliance with the rules, the regime itself need not perform 
the role. We call this externalized enforcement. Moreover, we argue that the 
coercion used to enforce the law need not involve the threat and exercise of 
violence. Rather, it may involve the threat of exclusion, or as we call it, 
outcasting. Unlike the distinctive method that modern states use to enforce their 
law, outcasting is nonviolent: it does not rely on bureaucratic organizations, 
such as police or militia, that employ physical force to maintain order. Instead, 
outcasting involves denying the disobedient the benefits of social cooperation 
and membership. And it is frequently carried out by those outside the regime. 
We call this externalized outcasting and argue that it is a form of law 
enforcement that is ubiquitous in modern international law. 
Seeing externalized outcasting as a form of law enforcement helps us see 
that the traditional critique of international law—that it is not enforced and is 
therefore both ineffective and not real law—is based on a limited and 
inaccurate understanding of law enforcement. Disobedience need not be met 
with the law’s iron fist—enforcement may simply involve denying the 
disobedient the benefits of social cooperation and membership. Once we 
broaden our understanding of law enforcement to include externalization and 
outcasting, rather than limiting it to internalization and violence, we will see 
that international law matters in the way that legal systems must matter. 
While we hope to rebut the principal source of skepticism about the legality 
of international law, we do not intend to completely answer the question of 
whether international law is law in this paper. To do so would require us to set 
out a complete theory of law, demonstrate that this theory deems international 
law to be a genuine legal system, and respond to the numerous objections 
lodged against the legality of international law over the last several centuries. 
Clearly, such a project is beyond the scope of a single article. Our aim is more 
limited, though we believe it to be quite substantial. For as we will show, 
responding to the principal objection to international law not only makes 
headway towards resolving the age-old question of whether international law 
is law, it also helps uncover certain truths about how international law affects 
state behavior that have hitherto been ignored by scholars who directly study 
such questions. 
We make our case in six parts. The first Part examines various objections 
levied against international law as law. We begin with John Austin’s classic 
argument that international law does not meet the basic conditions of law—
most notably, there is no sovereign capable of issuing commands. H.L.A. Hart 
famously demonstrated the flaws in Austin’s argument. We suggest that it is 
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possible to reframe Austin’s critique to accommodate Hart’s objections. In this 
reframed critique, international law is not law because it is (1) not backed by 
physically coercive sanctions and (2) not administered by members of the 
system in question. We develop these two objections—which we call the “Brute 
Force Objection” and the “Internality Objection.” Finally, we note that while 
the two objections are analytically distinct, they often come together as a 
package. That package is the Modern State Conception. 
In Part II, we develop the Modern State Conception and its application to 
international law. In order to set out a precise characterization of the Modern 
State Conception, we introduce the idea of an “enforcement chain.” An 
enforcement chain is a connected sequence of legal norms whose first link is a 
conduct rule (Don’t park in front of a fire hydrant!), and subsequent links are 
rules that are designed to enforce previous links (Pay a parking ticket!, or 
Impound the car of the person who has failed to pay his parking tickets!). The 
Modern State Conception holds that (1) conduct rules must be enforced 
through a law enforcement chain, and (2) at least one link in the chain must 
permit officials to use physical force. In this view, international law cannot be 
law because it is not enforced by international officials using physical force 
(though some regimes—including the United Nations as originally 
conceived—come close). We explain that we accept arguendo the first claim—
that law must be enforced to be law—but dispute the second—that law must be 
enforced by internal physical force. 
In Part III, we go on to show that the Modern State Conception is 
demonstrably false to the extent that it claims to be a complete description of 
what counts as law and law enforcement. A dominant mode of enforcement in 
domestic legal systems for the past two millennia—and one still actively in use 
in our own federal system today—has involved various forms of externalization 
and outcasting. The law has routinely used private parties to exile, 
excommunicate, outlaw, pillory, and shun those who break the rules. The 
recourse to externalization and outcasting is not simply a response to the 
technological and economic challenges of assembling a centralized body of 
individuals who are entrusted with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
In many legal systems, it is a feature, not a bug: using externalized 
enforcement and exclusion from the benefits of social cooperation and 
membership to enforce the law is in keeping with the values of the legal 
system, while the deployment of brute force is not. 
Having established both the possibility and ubiquity of externalization and 
outcasting in domestic law, we turn in Part IV to examining their role in 
international law. Rather than wielding physical coercion using its own police 
or armies, international law typically externalizes enforcement to outside 
parties (usually states) and engages in acts of nonviolent outcasting. To 
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demonstrate this, we offer detailed descriptions of externalization and 
outcasting in international law, drawing on examples from our earlier 
examination of domestic law, as well as from international law. This much 
more complete picture of law not only gives the lie to the Modern State 
Conception, but it also provides a new way of understanding international law 
and its enforcement. 
In Part V, we show that externalization and outcasting not only exist in 
international law, but that they are ubiquitous. Across radically different 
subject areas—from human rights to trade to the international postal service—
international legal institutions use others (usually states) to enforce their rules 
and typically deploy exclusion rather than physical force. These substantively 
diverse legal regimes have a set of common features. Once we describe these 
features—namely, their use of external enforcement and outcasting—we can 
see that regimes that appear on the surface to be very different are really 
applications of the same law enforcement model. At the same time, we can 
begin to identify a set of variations in the way external outcasting operates. We 
proceed, then, to examine five different categories of externalized outcasting—
what might be called variations on the externalized outcasting theme. We show 
that not only can we describe the different forms of outcasting, but we also can 
explain why they take the forms they do. Finally, we show how the variations in 
the characteristics of outcasting regimes work together to respond to specific 
challenges. We examine eight different forms of externalized outcasting and 
show how they are tailored to meet the enforcement needs of the areas of 
international law that they enforce. 
Finally, in Part VI, we show that the more complete picture of international 
law offered in this Article sets the stage for a reinvigorated inquiry into some of 
the central organizing questions in the field of international law today. We 
show that the phenomenon of externalized outcasting is germane to the efficacy 
of international law. For if externalized outcasting is a form of law 
enforcement, then its existence is highly relevant to the task of tallying the 
successes and failures of international law. Put slightly differently, if the only 
form of law enforcement one is willing to recognize is intimidation and 
violence by police, then international law will look pretty ineffective. We 
contend, however, that there are sources of motivation generated by 
international law which have hitherto been invisible to scholars and whose 
existence should be countenanced when deciding whether, when, and how 
international law matters. Moreover, the deeper and more accurate picture of 
international law that we provide—one that views externalized outcasting as an 
important and effective tool of law enforcement—goes beyond providing a 
more complete picture of international law. It offers a deeper understanding of 
how international law functions and thus allows scholars and practitioners to 
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more effectively anticipate and address international law’s shortcomings while 
enhancing its strengths. 
 
i .  skepticism about international law  
The question of whether international law is properly considered law is 
rarely debated these days. This reluctance, however, represents a significant 
departure from more than a century of preoccupation with this issue. Indeed, 
until recently, many considered it the organizing question of the field of 
international law.7 
In this Part, we will review the main objections made by the original 
skeptics of international law. While these arguments have proven faulty, we 
will see that it is possible to reformulate them so as to avoid their surface 
vulnerabilities. Our aim, then, is to continue the long-running conversation 
that was abruptly, and we think mistakenly, dropped several decades ago. In 
the process, we will show that adjudicating an issue that no one seems to care 
about any more will have profound implications for the questions that many 
now care about intensely. 
A. Austin’s Objection  
The locus classicus for the view that international law is not law is John 
Austin’s The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. To understand Austin’s 
skepticism, we must briefly recall the basic elements of Austin’s theory of law. 
According to Austin, all rules are general commands.8 A command is the 
expression of a wish by a person or determinate body, backed by a threat to 
inflict an evil in case the wish is not fulfilled, issued by someone who is willing 
and able to act on the threat.9 Austin calls the evil resulting from the violation 
of a command a “sanction.”10 
Having characterized the genus of rules as general commands, Austin 
proceeds to delimit the species of law. For Austin, only the rules of positive law 
are “law simply and strictly so called.”11 Positive law consists of those rules 
 
7.  See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 837 n.43 (2003) (“The organizing inquiry of 
international law is ‘is international law law?’”). 
8.  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 5-6 (Univ. of London 1832). 
9.  Id. at 6-8. 
10.  Id. at 8. 
11.  Id. at 378. 
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issued by the sovereign. The sovereign is someone who is habitually obeyed by 
the bulk of the community and habitually obeys no one else.12 Austin took the 
King-in-Parliament to be the British sovereign because the bulk of British 
society habitually obeyed the King-in-Parliament, while the King-in-
Parliament habitually obeyed no one else.13 
According to Austin, then, what makes a law the law is that it constitutes a 
general command issued by the sovereign. Given this jurisprudential 
conception, it is understandable that Austin would reject the legal status of 
international law. 
[T]he law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every 
positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state 
of subjection to its author . . . . [T]he law obtaining between nations is 
law (improperly so called) set by general opinion. The duties which it 
imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, 
or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and 
incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally 
received and respected.14  
International law appears to suffer from two defects on the Austinian 
model. First, the elements of international law are not commands, for 
commands are expressions of wishes of some person or well-defined collective 
body. The community of nations, however, is an “indeterminate” body and is 
thus incapable of expressing wishes.15 International law can only be set by 
general opinion, not command. Second, laws properly so-called are commands 
issued by the sovereign. International law, however, lacks a sovereign—there is 
no nation or supranational body that is habitually obeyed and obeys no one 
else. 
 
12.  Id. at 210. 
13.  Technically, Austin regarded the corporate body of the King, the peers, and the electors of 
the House of Commons as the sovereign. See id. at 235-41. 
14.  Id. at 208. 
15.  Id. at 147. 
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Austin’s attack on international law was highly influential.16 Sir Thomas 
Holland, who occupied the Chichele Chair of International Law and 
Diplomacy at Oxford for thirty-six years and wrote the famous treatise The 
Elements of Jurisprudence, argued that international law was “law only by 
courtesy.”17 Because international law lacks a “political arbiter by which it can 
be enforced,”18 its rules are best considered as “the moral code of nations.”19 
William Edward Hearn, a passionate devotee of Austinian jurisprudence, 
declared that “[l]aw cannot be predicated of mere customs which are not even 
true commands, much less the commands of any competent State.”20 
Even those who objected strongly to Austin’s theory of law nevertheless 
agreed with him on the defects of international law as law. Edward Jenks 
rejected the idea that all laws must be commands and that all laws must be 
issued by an omnipotent sovereign; yet, he thought that international law was 
not fully law. “Although, in fact, many important nations have agreed to 
submit certain classes of disputes between one another to judicial or arbitral 
treatment by international tribunals, . . . yet such tribunals have no executive 
 
16.  Not everyone accepted Austin’s skeptical view; indeed, many Austinian sympathizers 
accepted the legal status of international law. Though E.C. Clark regarded law as “a rule of 
human conduct sanctioned by human displeasure,” E.C. CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE: 
A COMMENT ON AUSTIN 188 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1883) (emphasis omitted), he was 
nevertheless adamant that international law fit such a definition. According to Clark, 
international law is law because it is backed by the general hostility engendered by the 
violation of its rules. Id. at 186 (“I maintain that the rules of International Conduct, as now 
actually administered by the general consent and action of civilised nations, constitute a 
practical law, to which it is absurd to deny the name . . . .”). J.L. Brierly not only denied that 
legal systems must make provisions for sanctions, but regarded self-help in international 
law as a form of sanctioning. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 101 (1963) (“This 
absence of an executive power means that each state remains free . . . to take such action as it 
thinks fit to enforce its own rights. This does not mean that international law has no 
sanctions, if that word is used in its proper sense of means for securing the observance of the 
law . . . .”). 
17.  THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 133 (13th ed. 1924). 
18.  Id. at 134 (“[L]aw without an arbiter is a contradiction in terms.”). 
19.  Id. at 135. 
20.  WILLIAM EDWARD HEARN, THE THEORY OF LEGAL DUTIES AND RIGHTS 40 (London, Trübner 
& Co. 1883); see also 2 JAMES PATERSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LIBERTY OF THE SUBJECT 
AND THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RELATING TO THE SECURITY OF THE PERSON 97 (London, 
Macmillan & Co. 1877) (“[T]o call [public international law] a law at all is rather a figure of 
speech than a correct use of technical language. It is a law only in the sense in which the 
code of honour or the code of morals, or religion, or any other rule of conduct is a law, being 
a collection of self-imposed rules and maxims drawn up in imitation of municipal 
laws . . . .”). 
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authority, and cannot enforce submission to their decisions . . . .”21 George 
Paton departed so far from Austin that he claimed that “[i]t is possible to 
conceive of law without a sovereign authority or a court without compulsory 
jurisdiction or even perhaps if there are no organs of enforcement.”22 For 
Paton, the essential feature was instead the regulation of self-help: “[T]he 
moment when law emerges is when self-help is regulated by the community.”23 
Unfortunately, according to Paton, the regulation of self-help in the 
international sphere was only beginning to emerge. “So long as all declarations 
of war are lawful, it is difficult to say that a system of law is in operation.”24 
B. The Internality Objection  
In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart showed that Austin’s theory of law is 
seriously flawed. As he pointed out, Austin was mistaken to claim that all laws 
arise from commands. Custom, for example, is a recognized source of law in 
domestic legal systems.25 But as Hart noted, domestic customary norms are set 
by the mere opinion and moral sanctions of indeterminate bodies, not by 
imperatives. Modern legislation cannot be construed as commands either. One 
cannot command oneself but, as Hart argued, legislators can and typically do 
enact legislation that applies to themselves.26 Austin, therefore, cannot impugn 
international law for not arising from commands, for most domestic law does 
not arise from commands either. 
Hart also showed that the absence of an Austinian sovereign does not 
detract from the legality of international law insofar as most domestic systems 
lack a sovereign as well.27 An Austinian sovereign is legally omnicompetent but 
the sovereign’s powers in modern domestic regimes are usually limited. The 
United States Constitution, for example, limits the sovereign powers of the 
American people, both by making certain constitutional provisions 
 
21.  EDWARD JENKS, THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE 11 (1933); see GEORGE W. KEETON, THE ELEMENTARY 
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE (1930); see also FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR STUDENTS OF THE COMMON LAW 14 (5th ed. 1923) (suggesting 
international law is analogous to “those customs and observances in an imperfectly 
organised society which have not fully acquired the character of law, but are on the way to 
become law”). 
22.  GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON, A TEXT-BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 71 n.1 (1st ed. 1946). 
23.  Id. at 71. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 44-49 (2d ed. 1994). 
26.  See id. at 42-44. 
27.  See id. at 66-78, 221. 
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unalterable28 and prescribing an extremely onerous procedure that must be 
followed before an amendment is ratified.29 The United States has a legal 
system even though it does not have an Austinian sovereign. 
While Hart’s critique is certainly correct, the Austinian critique can be 
reframed in a way that captures the essence of the challenge but dodges the 
Hartian responses. To see how this might be done, let us begin with the core 
idea behind Austin’s theory of law. We might say that, according to Austin, the 
distinctiveness of the law as a social institution is constituted by the unique 
way in which it seeks to affect human behavior. 
First and foremost, the law distinguishes itself because it seeks to affect 
behavior through the enforcement of its rules. Subjects are encouraged to obey 
because consequences they care about follow from their decision to comply. 
Second, the law is distinctive because its enforcement comes in the form of 
sanctions that attach to noncompliance. In Austin’s formulation, “evils” follow 
disobedience. Third, sanctions are imposed by powerful members of the 
population, otherwise known as “officials.” 
According to Austin, then, the distinctiveness of the law is constituted by 
how it seeks to affect behavior and by whom. To be law, a regime must matter 
through (1) enforcement, which takes the form of (2) sanctions for 
disobedience (3) imposed by the officials of an extremely powerful group. 
Once we notice that Austin’s theory is predicated on a view about the 
distinctive ways in which law seeks to affect behavior, we see that he did not 
have to insist that all laws are commands issued by a sovereign. Instead, Austin 
could have relaxed his jurisprudential model by merely requiring that laws be 
enforced by sanctions (even if they were not created by commands) and 
administered by officials of the normative system in question (even if the 
regime does not have an Austinian sovereign). A regime that does not enforce 
its rules through the imposition of sanctions, or has sanctions but delegates 
enforcement to non-regime members, cannot be a legal system. 
Notice that this weaker set of conditions still impugns the legality of 
international law. With few exceptions, which we will explore in Part II, 
international law does not seek to affect behavior by sanctioning the violation 
of its rules “internally,” that is, through designated international bureaucracies. 
It relies primarily on nation-states to ensure that violations of the rules are 
sanctioned. We call this the “Internality Objection.” 
 
28.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting abolition of the slave trade before 1808); U.S. 
CONST. art. V (providing that “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate”). 
29.  See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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As an illustration of the Internality Objection, consider the World Trade 
Organization. The World Trade Organization (WTO), with 153 member 
states30 representing more than ninety-seven percent of world trade,31 is widely 
considered one of the strongest and most effective international legal 
organizations of the modern era. And yet, the WTO itself does not have the 
authority under international law to enforce the rules that it creates. The 
Internality Objection therefore holds that those rules are not, in fact, law. 
The enforcement of international trade law principles of the WTO occurs 
through “a compulsory third party adjudication system.”32 Under the WTO 
agreement,33 member states agree to resolve disputes exclusively through the 
adjudicative procedure,34 and states are required to abide by decisions issued by 
the expert panels and the appellate body to avoid retaliation.35 If the offending 
party refuses to comply, decisions of the panel are enforced through authorized 
economic retaliation imposed by the aggrieved state party. 
In the context of international trade, therefore, trade law principles are not 
enforced internally, namely, by the officials of the WTO itself. Rather, 
sanctions are imposed and administered by the officials of the aggrieved state 
party. The WTO merely authorizes state parties with legitimate complaints to 
retaliate against noncompliant states through a limited denial of Most Favored 
Nation status. This authorization permits a state with a legitimate complaint to 
impose offsetting tariffs and other protectionist measures on a state that is 
found to have violated its treaty obligations. The WTO, in other words, 
 
30.  See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
31.  The World Trade Organization, WORLD TRADE ORG., 7 (2009), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf.  
32.  Petros C. Mavroidis, Licence To Adjudicate: A Critical Evaluation of the Work of the WTO 
Appellate Body So Far, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 73, 73 (James C. Hartigan ed., 2009); see 
also BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 77 (2007) (noting that trade law and the law of the sea 
provide “the only two operational examples in international relations of compulsory third 
party adjudication”). 
33.  The dispute resolution process is governed, in particular, by Annex 2 of the WTO 
Agreement. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
34.  See HOEKMAN & MAVROIDIS, supra note 32, at 78. 
35.  See Pao-Li Chang, The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
WTO, supra note 32, at 91, 92. 
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delegates the enforcement of its rules to the bureaucratic machinery of its 
members, typically its legislative or executive branches. Enforcement of trade 
rules is a form of externalized sanctioning: the retaliation is performed by the 
member states, not the WTO. The WTO is simply the gatekeeper. 
According to the Internality Objection, international law cannot be a 
genuine legal system because it does not enforce its own rules and hence does 
not seek to affect behavior in the right way. As the WTO example illustrates, 
the enforcement of international law is not administered by designated 
international organizations. Rather, sanctions are delegated to external parties, 
namely, the governmental bureaucracies of member states, to impose and 
administer. 
C. The Brute Force Objection 
Having sketched the Internality Objection, we now note a related challenge 
to international law. Recall the passage quoted above in which Austin states 
that international law is backed solely by “moral sanctions,”36 i.e., a diffuse 
hostility that nations express when the rules of international law are broken. 
This passage suggests that the objection to international law is that it does not 
sanction the violation of its rules through the use of brute physical force; it 
merely contents itself with weak “moral” sanctions. Call this the “Brute Force 
Objection.”37 
Once again, let us illustrate the Brute Force Objection by considering the 
WTO. As one commentator put it, when states are found to have violated the 
trade rules, “there is no prospect of incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for 
harm inflicted or police enforcement. The WTO has no jailhouse, no bail 
bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas.”38 The WTO, in other 
words, does not enforce its rules through the threat or exercise of physical 
force. Member states may not resort to violence either. As mentioned above, 
 
36.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
37.  We do not mean to suggest that Austin himself accepted the Brute Force Objection. Though 
Austin claims that international law was deficient for only imposing moral sanctions, he 
does not explicitly require that sanctions be physical in nature and, in certain places, implies 
that they are not. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 8-9 (rejecting Paley’s view that sanctions 
must be “violent”). It is plausible to suppose, however, that Austin’s critique of international 
law was influential in getting others to accept the Brute Force Objection, even if he did not 
accept it himself. 
38.  Judith Hippler Bello, Editorial Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less 
Is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416, 417 (1996). 
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trade law is enforced through retaliatory trade measures taken by the aggrieved 
parties. 
The Brute Force Objection is rooted in a widespread intuition that law and 
physical coercion are intimately connected. Robert Cover famously expressed 
this intuition at the beginning of his essay, Violence and the Word, when he 
wrote: “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”39 Indeed, 
Cover thought the link between violence and law to be “obvious”40 and to sever 
the connection would be “something less (or more) than law.”41 Similarly, 
Hans Kelsen characterized the law as the “organization of force.”42 Law differs 
from morality and religion on his account insofar as legal demands are backed 
by socially organized physical coercion. 
The Brute Force Objection is distinct from the Internality Objection insofar 
as it does not focus on who enforces the law but rather how it is enforced. It 
claims that legal systems must matter to us in the same way that modern 
domestic legal systems do, namely, through threat or exercise of brute physical 
force. 
D. The Modern State Conception 
The Internality and Brute Force objections are analytically distinct, but they 
nonetheless frequently come together as a package. Critics often assume that a 
regime is law only when it (1) contains bureaucratic enforcement mechanisms, 
i.e., it enjoys internality, and (2) those mechanisms employ intimidation and 
violence to ensure compliance, i.e., it uses physical force. Thus, international 
law fails on this view to be a legal regime for two reasons: (1) it lacks its own 
enforcement mechanisms, and (2) it lacks internal mechanisms that employ 
brute force. 
It is not surprising that these two objections are commonly paired. For 
these objections are simply expressions of different aspects of the same 
jurisprudential account, namely, what we called the “Modern State 
Conception” of law. According to the Modern State Conception, a regime 
counts as a legal one only if it seeks to affect behavior in the manner that 
modern states do: it must enjoy a monopoly over the use of physical force and 
 
39.  Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (footnote omitted). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. at 1607. 
42.  HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 21 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945). 
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employ this monopoly to enforce its rules.43 The Modern State Conception, in 
other words, requires legal systems to (1) possess internal enforcement 
mechanisms (2) that use the threat and exercise of physical force. It follows on 
this view that international law is not a proper legal system because it does not 
contain these sorts of institutions and hence cannot affect behavior in the right 
way. For this reason, we call the combination of the Internality and Brute Force 
objections the “Modern State Objection.” 
The Modern State Objection takes modern domestic legal systems as the 
paradigm cases of law and judges all other regimes against this ideal. Because 
international law does not resemble the modern state in the way in which it 
seeks to control behavior, this objection denies international law 
jurisprudential status. Consider, in this regard, John Bolton’s critique of 
international treaty law. “It is a flat misunderstanding of reality,” Bolton 
argues, “to believe that there are enforcement mechanisms ‘out there’ 
internationally that conform to the kind of legal system that exists in the 
United States.”44 When a contract is breached in domestic law, he notes, “there 
is a defined way to get remedies. There is a process to decide which promises 
are legitimate and a procedure to enforce a court order that a party has 
breached a promise.”45 By contrast, no similar procedure exists for redressing 
the violation of treaty obligations.46 
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It 
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the 
honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its 
infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and 
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which 
may in the end be enforced by actual war.  
This is not domestic law at work. Accordingly, there is no reason to 
consider treaties as “legally” binding internationally, and certainly not 
as “law” themselves.47 
 
43.  In a recent article, Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast have independently identified (what 
we call) the “Modern State Conception” as an assumption shared by many theorists of law 
and have developed an alternative model in which nonofficials collectively enforce the rules 
of the group through boycotting. See Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What Is 
Law? A Coordination Account of the Characteristics of Legal Order, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707083. 
44.  John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2000). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. 
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Bolton’s argument seems to be that treaties cannot generate real legal 
obligations because there are no force-based mechanisms “out there” to ensure 
their compliance. Treaties cannot be a source of law, in other words, because 
there are no treaty police. While contractual breaches can be redressed through 
the threat or exercise of physical coercion by the state, violations of treaty 
obligations can only be enforced by the moral sanctions of the international 
community or the self-help remedy of war.48 
i i .  law enforcement in the modern state conception 
In the Parts that follow, we will attempt to evaluate the cogency of the 
Modern State Objection by examining and critiquing its underlying conception 
of law. It behooves us, therefore, to say a bit more about the Modern State 
Conception of law and its constitutive elements. To do so, we must first clarify 
its notion of law enforcement. 
A. Primary and Secondary Enforcement 
It is commonplace to say that the law enforces its demands by imposing 
costs on those who violate its rules. But what exactly does this mean? How 
does the law impose costs on rule violators? Take a trivial example of law 
enforcement. Suppose you forget to put money in a parking meter when you 
park your car. The standard response from the police is a parking ticket. A 
parking ticket is a demand to pay a fixed sum of money because of a parking 
violation. In other words, the police do not wait until you return to the car and 
forcibly take your money. Rather, they impose a duty on you to pay the 
parking violation bureau. Of course, if you fail to pay, the law will likely 
become more aggressive. The police may end up booting your tire or seizing 
your car, or the sheriff may come to your house and confiscate goods equal to 
the value of the fine or, worse, lead you off to jail. 
Let us distinguish, accordingly, among three kinds of legal rules. Conduct 
rules tell people which actions they are obligated, prohibited, or permitted to 
perform. They require us to put money in meters if we want to park, to pay 
taxes on our income, and not to engage in arson. A subset of conduct rules are 
enforcement rules. The function of enforcement rules is to ensure that the 
 
48.  For a popular expression of the Modern State Conception as applied to international law, 
see Editorial, Scorning the World Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1985/01/20/opinion/scorning-the-world-court.html, which states that “[s]trictly speaking, 
there being no world government, there’s no such thing as world law.” 
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conduct rules are followed. Primary enforcement rules are addressed to the 
conduct rule violators. These rules either impose duties on violators to perform 
some costly act or deny them a beneficial right. Primary enforcement rules may 
obligate the conduct rule violator to pay a fine, report to jail, leave the country, 
wear a red letter, etc., or deny them the right to drive, serve liquor, exclude 
others from taking their property, etc. 
If primary enforcement rules are the law’s Plan B, then secondary 
enforcement rules are its Plan C. Secondary enforcement rules come into play 
when the conduct rule violator fails to follow the primary enforcement rules.49 
These rules either impose duties on people other than the conduct rule violator 
to perform some harmful act on (or refrain from performing some beneficial 
act for) the conduct rule violator, or the rules permit people other than the 
conduct rule violator to perform some harmful act on (or refrain from 
performing some beneficial act for) the conduct rule violator. Thus, secondary 
enforcement rules may require the police to apprehend the conduct rule 
violators, shame them, seize their property, etc., or permit creditors to seize 
property from debtors, allow crime victims to retaliate against offenders, 
authorize property owners to physically exclude trespassers, etc. 
Primary enforcement rules are frequently backed by multiple secondary 
enforcement rules. For example, unpaid parking tickets may be enforced 
through the garnishment of wages. The rule requiring garnishment is a 
secondary one insofar as it is directed to someone other than the parking 
scofflaw, namely, the scofflaw’s employer. Suppose that the employer fails to 
withhold wages. The law will likely require officials to take further steps to 
ensure that the employer complies (e.g., demanding that the employer pay a 
fine, revoking his license, etc.). Ultimately, the law may require officials to use 
physical force against the employer (or others). They may shutter the doors, 
imprison the CEO for contempt, or enter the business premises and take the 
money themselves. In such cases, law enforcement bottoms out in physical 
force employed by legal officials. 
We can think of legal rules, therefore, as forming enforcement chains. The 
first link in the chain is the conduct rule being enforced by the subsequent 
rules. Typically, the second link is a primary enforcement rule that imposes 
duties on those who violate the initial conduct rule. Later links are normally 
secondary rules that enforce the prior primary rules (and transitively the initial 
conduct rule). 
 
49.  Secondary enforcement rules can exist even when there are no primary enforcement rules. 
They are “secondary” rules because they are directed at individuals other than the conduct 
rule violators. 
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Enforcement chains may also be split into subchains. A jurisdiction may 
respond to unpaid parking tickets by requiring employers to garnish wages and 
by requiring police to seize the offenders’ cars. These subchains likely will be of 
differing lengths: the law may have contingency plans for the failure of 
employers to garnish wages but have no response for the failure of the police to 
seize the cars. 
We can now see how the law enforces its rules: it imposes costs on rule 
violators either by (1) imposing duties on them or others or both or (2) denying them 
rights or providing rights to others or both. Primary enforcement rules require 
conduct rule violators to act in ways deemed costly or deny them the right to 
act in ways deemed beneficial. Secondary enforcement rules require or permit 
others to act in ways deemed costly to the conduct rule violator or not to act in 
ways deemed beneficial. These primary and secondary rules form chains, with 
each rule designed to enforce earlier links and, ultimately, to ensure that the 
initial conduct rule is followed. 
Having clarified the notion of enforcement, we can now state more clearly 
the basic presuppositions of the Modern State Conception of law. Its first tenet 
holds that most conduct rules must be enforced in order to be law. 
Enforcement Thesis: Most legal conduct rules are part of law 
enforcement chains.  
The second tenet defines a “law enforcement chain” as one that authorizes or 
mandates internalized violence. 
Internalized Violence Thesis: A law enforcement chain is an 
enforcement chain that has at least one secondary link that either 
requires or permits officials to use physical force on the person who 
violated the initial link or on his or her property.  
The Modern State Conception can be seen, therefore, as a theory composed of 
a necessary condition and a definition. The Enforcement Thesis demands that 
most legal conduct rules be part of law enforcement chains, while the 
Internalized Violence Thesis defines a “law enforcement chain” as one that 
threatens violence by officials at some point in the sequence. 
It should be pointed out that the Modern State Conception does not 
require the regime in question to include the full panoply of coercive 
bureaucratic institutions characteristic of contemporary states. It need not have 
police, militia, large prosecutorial agencies, and correctional institutions. But it 
must at least have some such bodies. It might have police but not public 
prosecutors; it might have jails, guards, and wardens but not police; it might 
have police and prosecutors but no prisons. As long as some institution exists 
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whose role is to use the threat or exercise of physical force in order to enforce 
conduct rules, the Modern State Conception will recognize the regime as law. 
Two final clarifications are in order. First, the Modern State Conception 
does not demand that the law seek to affect behavior only through the threat 
and exercise of violence. Officials may appeal, for example, to the citizenry’s 
sense of moral obligation to obey the law or to their patriotism. The Modern 
State Conception insists, however, that these motivations are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the existence of law. Regardless of how else a regime seeks to 
affect behavior, at the very least it must do so through internal threats and the 
exercise of physical force. Second, the Modern State Conception does not 
demand that obedience to the law be coercively obtained. The motivation for 
obeying the conduct rules, in other words, need not be “transmitted” up the 
enforcement chain from the secondary rules threatening force. Why citizens 
obey the law is left open by the account. The Modern State Conception insists 
that the law give citizens a certain kind of reason in order to be law, not that 
they act for that reason. 
B. Does International Law Satisfy the Modern State Conception?  
The Modern State Objection claims that international law is not law 
because most of its rules are not part of law enforcement chains. Without its 
own police, prosecutors, or jailors, international law cannot be enforced by the 
right people in the right way. 
We can imagine two ways in which to respond to the Modern State 
Objection. One accepts its underlying theory of law, i.e., the Modern State 
Conception, but argues that international law does indeed satisfy it. The other 
accepts that international law does not satisfy the Modern State Conception, 
but argues that the Modern State Conception is itself flawed. Let us discuss 
each in turn. 
The first response to the Modern State Objection maintains that 
international law fits the Modern State Conception. The best example for such 
a claim would likely be mutual defense treaties, which are core instruments of 
international law. The North Atlantic Treaty, and the organization it creates 
(the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), is one of the most robust mutual 
defense treaties. The provisions for collective self-defense represent the core of 
the NATO alliance50 and emerged as a device to deter the threat of Soviet 
 
50.  See PAUL E. GALLIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-717 F, NATO: ARTICLE V AND COLLECTIVE 
DEFENSE (1997). 
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aggression—and to respond to it, if needed.51 Under Article V of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, member states commit to come to the aid of one another: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . 
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of 
the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked . . . .52  
Decisions to use force to repel aggression are made and enforced by internal 
NATO structures. The principal decisionmaking body of NATO is the North 
Atlantic Council, which is made up of representatives from each of the twenty-
six member states.53 The Council can direct a response by the NATO Response 
Force, which operates as a standing army ready to respond to acts of aggression 
against a member state. The Force provides NATO with the ability to react 
quickly to situations of threat and engage in high-intensity combat on a 
modern battlefield for thirty days on its own, or for a longer period as part of a 
NATO Combined Joint Task Force.54 
Even NATO, however, suffers from a flaw in the eyes of the Modern State 
Conception of law enforcement. Yes, it can deploy physical force. And, yes, it 
has its own forces capable of engaging in that physical force. But the laws it 
enforces are not its own. It exists, instead, to enforce the U.N. Charter’s Article 
2(4) prohibition on the use of force and Article 51 right of self-defense. NATO’s 
enforcement mechanism is thus external rather than internal to the legal system 
it exists to enforce. 
The United Nations Charter offers yet another instance in which 
international law nearly meets the Modern State Conception, but falls just 
short. A central principle of international law—codified in Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter—is the prohibition on the use of aggressive force by a 
sovereign state against the sovereign territory or political independence of 
 
51.  See FUTURE NATO SECURITY: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF EVOLVING SECURITY AND 
INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS AND ARCHITECTURES, at vii (Martin Edmonds & Oldrich 
Cerny eds., 2004). 
52.  North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. 
53.  NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION: 60TH ANNIVERSARY 2 (Hanna Weijers ed., 2009). 
54.  JEFFREY P. BIALOS & STUART L. KOEHL, THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE: FACILITATING 
COALITION WARFARE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INFORMATION SHARING 1 
(Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2018%20NATO 
%20Response%20Force.pdf. 
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another state.55 Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is 
empowered to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression” and to take action to “restore international peace 
and security.”56 
The founders of the United Nations expected that a significant portion of 
the enforcement actions under Chapter VII would be carried out by forces 
assembled from member states who would “make available to the Security 
Council” armed forces and assistance pursuant to special agreements.57 A 
Military Staff Committee (MSC) would be responsible for “the strategic 
direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.”58 
Had this vision been realized, it would have satisfied the Modern State 
Conception of law enforcement by giving the United Nations Security Council 
the power to deploy internal physical force to enforce its decisions. But this 
vision was never realized. It fell victim to the Cold War before it could take 
shape.59 Instead, it is the member states that carry out the enforcement actions 
specified in Security Council resolutions through external physical enforcement.60 
Even if there are cases in which international law meets the stringent 
criteria of the Modern State Conception of law (we, as yet, have not identified 
any), it is inarguable that most of international law does not. Hence when 
defenders of international law respond to critiques of international law by 
pointing to such structures, they effectively fall into a trap. Critics are likely to 
respond to such examples by noting first that the defenders of international 
law are picking out, at best, a few good examples for their case. Second, they 
will likely point out that any international law that actually fits this conception 
 
55.  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
56.  Id. art. 39. Chapter VII, by its very title, outlines the United Nations’ response to “Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Id. ch. 7. 
57.  Id. art. 43, paras. 1-3.  
58.  Id. art. 47, para. 3. The Military Staff Committee is established by Article 47(1). The 
responsibility of the Military Staff Committee for the “strategic direction of any armed 
forces” is set forth in Article 47(3). For more on the procedures set forth in Articles 42, 43, 
and 47, see Eugene V. Rostow, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations 
Law, Continued, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 506, 507-08 (1991), which argues that the enforcement 
provisions in the U.N. Charter have not yet been fully realized. 
59.  It was described by one historian as “a sterile monument to the faded hopes of the founders 
of the UN.” Eric Grove, U.N. Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee: A Look Back, 
INT’L SECURITY, Spring 1993, at 172, 172. 
60.  External physical enforcement under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is discussed in more 
depth in Section IV.A. 
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of law is arguably antisovereigntist and antidemocratic, for if international law 
is enforced against member states in the way that domestic law is enforced 
against individuals in a modern state (through internal threats of force), then 
international law lays claim to the right to subjugate nation-states to the will of 
the international organization in the same way that nation-states lay claim to 
subjugating individuals to the will of the national government.61 That position 
may be particularly difficult for advocates of international law to defend when 
the sovereign state in question is a democracy. Advocates of international law, 
unprepared to adequately respond to either critique, tend to let the 
conversation drop at this point—or they deny the legitimacy of the inquiry at 
all (witness the quotations with which this Article opened). 
C. Is the Modern State Conception Valid?  
Instead of arguing that international law satisfies the Modern State 
Conception, the more promising and, in fact, popular strategy in defense of 
international law has been to argue against the Modern State Conception itself. 
Thus, most defenders concede that international law is not enforced through 
the barrel of a U.N. gun, but they deny that enforcement is necessary for 
legality. In other words, they seek to undercut the Modern State Conception by 
attacking the Enforcement Thesis. On their view, most conduct rules need not 
be part of enforcement chains in order to be legal rules. Indeed, they are willing 
to accept as a conceptual possibility that a regime can still be a legal system 
 
61.  Consider, for example, the following critiques of international law, drawn from public 
debates. On the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, Congressman Ron Paul argued: 
“[I]t is time to stop trying to manipulate the United Nations and start asserting our national 
sovereignty. If we do not, rest assured that the United Nations will continue to interfere, not 
only in our foreign policy, but in our domestic policies, as well.” 149 CONG. REC. 9949 
(2003) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul). Pat Buchanan similarly argued that the Law of the Sea 
Treaty “represents a permanent loss of national sovereignty. Hence it is inherently un-
American.” Patrick J. Buchanan, Should the U.N. Be Lord of the Oceans?, AM. CAUSE (Feb. 28, 
2005), http://www.theamericancause.org/a-pjb-050228-lordoftheoceans.htm. Conservative 
commentator Frank Gaffney wrote: “Just as Hurricane Katrina ruptured the levees 
protecting New Orleans, the concerted U.N. assault on the barriers to further erosion of 
American sovereignty threatens to swamp our freedom of action and our Founding principle 
of ‘no taxation without representation.’” Frank Gaffney, Sovereignty Levees Breached?, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/sep/12/20050912 
-090351-9594r. Representative Christopher Smith, speaking about the Convention To 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, asked: “Do our constituents . . . 
really want a group of international bureaucrats telling them that the day set aside to honor 
our mothers must be abolished?” Women’s Rights Treaty a Threat to Mother’s Day, Lawmaker 
Says, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 2000, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-05-04/news/0005040213 
_1_treaty-women-have-equal-rights-mother-s-day (quoting Rep. Christopher Smith). 
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even though it does not enforce any of its rules. The fact that international law 
does not have the right enforcement mechanism, therefore, is not fatal to its 
legality, for a regime does not need any enforcement mechanism to be law, let 
alone the right kind. 
Those who reject the Enforcement Thesis have presented three sorts of 
arguments in their support. The first kind employs a philosophical thought 
experiment. Consider a community of extremely conscientious and well-
intentioned individuals who are governed by a democratically elected assembly 
and a cadre of wise judges. Because the members of this community completely 
and wholeheartedly accept the legitimacy of the governing regime and 
consequently always obey the rules, the community has no police, jails, or 
other mechanisms of enforcement. Joseph Raz, for example, imagines a society 
of angels governed by legislatures and courts that is so obedient that subjects 
do not need to be threatened with sanctions for breaking the rules.62 
Many have the intuition that such sanctionless communities have law. If we 
take this intuition seriously, then we should reject the Enforcement Thesis. For 
while enforcement is normally required in the actual world, given human 
weakness and foibles, the thought experiment shows that beings who can be 
trusted to do what they think is right and, as a result, do not need coercive 
enforcement can nevertheless have law. Contrary to the Modern State 
Conception, most legal conduct rules need not be part of enforcement chains, 
let alone law enforcement chains; in fact, none of them do. 
Though we are personally persuaded by this argument, we are aware that 
many are not. Some reject it because they do not trust intuitions about bizarre 
hypotheticals. Since we never encounter anything like angelic legal systems, 
they complain, we cannot be confident in our reactions to such outlandish 
scenarios. Others reject the argument because their intuitions pull in precisely 
the opposite direction: they are convinced that “law” without enforcement 
would not really be law.63 
Because the status and outcome of such thought experiments are 
controversial and have failed to persuade many people, we will eschew them in 
this Article. We will, therefore, restrict our evidence to actual legal systems. A 
regime will constitute a counterexample to the Modern State Conception only 
if it exists or has existed and our intuitions are reasonably firm about its 
jurisprudential status. 
 
62.  JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 159-60 (1975); see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 
169-75 (2011). 
63.  See, e.g., Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1195, 1235-38 (2008). 
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A second strategy for rejecting the Enforcement Thesis relies on empirical 
observation, not philosophical intuition. It proceeds by noting that people 
normally obey the law out of a sense of moral obligation. Consider Anthony 
D’Amato’s argument against the idea that “enforcement is the hallmark of 
law”: 
Most of “law” concerns itself with the interpretation and enforcement 
of private contracts, the redress of intentional and negligent harms, 
rules regarding sales of goods and sales of securities, rules relating to 
the family and the rights of members thereof, and other such rules, 
norms, and cases. The rules are obeyed not out of fear of the state’s 
power, but because the rules by and large are perceived to be right, just, 
or appropriate.64 
According to D’Amato, coercive enforcement does not play a major role in 
ordinary compliance with law. Since legal rules are obeyed rather out of a sense 
of moral obligation, enforcement cannot be constitutive of legality. D’Amato 
concludes that skeptics who believe that international law cannot be law 
because it lacks enforcement mechanisms must, therefore, be mistaken. 
Unfortunately, D’Amato’s argument misses the mark. The Enforcement 
Thesis does not claim that a regime is a legal system only if its subjects comply 
out of fear of enforcement. As we noted earlier, this thesis is agnostic on why 
citizens obey the law. The Enforcement Thesis merely requires that law 
enforcement mechanisms exist, not that citizens act because of them. Critics of 
international law, therefore, can recognize that people normally obey law out of 
moral considerations but also maintain that a regime would not be law if it did 
not provide them alternative reasons to comply. 
D’Amato’s argument fails for an additional reason. One cannot infer from 
the fact that citizens normally obey out of moral considerations that 
“enforcement is not a hallmark of law.” For it is plausible to suppose that 
regimes are perceived as legitimate only because enforcement mechanisms exist 
for those who do not accept the legitimacy of the regime. In other words, 
people are willing to obey the law out of the sense of moral obligation only 
because they have assurance that they won’t be “suckers” and that those who 
break the rules will be punished for doing so. 
The final attempt to undermine the Enforcement Thesis distinguishes 
sharply between ordinary domestic law and public law. According to this 
response, the Enforcement Thesis is a plausible requirement to impose on rules 
that bind ordinary citizens. The rules of criminal law, torts, contract law, and 
 
64.  D’Amato, supra note 6, at 1295. 
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so on are indeed backed by the physically coercive power of the State. By 
contrast, public law—the rules that bind state actors—are not enforced in this 
way. Indeed, the argument proceeds, they are not enforceable at all. And 
because public law is unenforceable, the Enforcement Thesis is not a plausible 
requirement to impose on this group of legal rules and hence cannot be a 
principle valid for all legal rules. 
Because this is a provocative argument, we should examine it closely. 
Consider the institution of judicial review. Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson 
argue that its power to enforce constitutional law is an illusion. They write: 
Courts are cast as powerful enforcement agents, prevailing upon the 
political branches of government to comply with their commands. But 
of course courts cannot play any such role. Courts are merely 
subdivisions of government, lacking the powers of purse and sword 
that might be used to coerce the compliance of other government 
officials and their constituents.65  
Contrary to the received wisdom, courts cannot enforce constitutional law 
because they are the “least dangerous branch.”66 Judges merely declare a law or 
action “unconstitutional” but have no power to back up such declarations with 
coercion. 
Courts are not the only powerless ones. According to Goldsmith and 
Levinson, no one can enforce domestic public law. With “no sovereign above 
the sovereign,” there is no body powerful enough to employ coercion against 
wayward state actors. “[P]ublic law cannot rely on the enforcement capacity of 
states for compliance. Lacking the kind of ‘external’ enforcement mechanism 
that states provide for ordinary domestic law, public law regimes must be 
internally self-enforcing through some combination of rationally self-interested 
and normative, internalized, or role-based motivations.”67 
 
65.  Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1831 (2009) (paragraph break omitted). It should be 
made clear that Goldsmith and Levinson do not themselves argue that international law is 
law or that the Enforcement Thesis is false. They simply argue that international law shares 
with constitutional law “the absence of an enforcement authority capable of coercing 
powerful political actors to comply with unpopular decisions.” Id. at 1794. We are using 
their argument about the unenforceability of public law to construct a possible argument 
against the Enforcement Thesis. 
66.  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
67.  Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1840. 
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Goldsmith and Levinson extend their argument to public international law. 
Just as domestic public law is unenforceable against domestic state actors, 
public international law cannot be enforced against them either. Since there is 
“no sovereign above the sovereign,” there is no way to coerce wayward state 
actors to comply with the public law of the international realm. 
If we accept Goldsmith and Levinson’s argument about the unenforceability 
of public law, then the Enforcement Thesis loses its appeal. Since domestic 
public law is law despite being unenforceable, rules can be legal norms even 
though they are not enforced. And if the Enforcement Thesis is invalid, then 
the Modern State Conception is invalid as well. International law cannot, 
therefore, be denied the status of legality simply because it lacks mechanisms of 
coercive enforcement. 
The success of this refutation of the Modern State Conception hinges on 
the claim that domestic public law is unenforceable. But is that true? Consider 
United States v. Nixon.68 In that case, Richard Nixon refused to hand over the 
tapes to the special prosecutor investigating Watergate, claiming executive 
privilege. The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed and ordered the 
President to turn over the tapes. Nixon complied with this order. Far from 
being a feckless institution, then, judicial review was a highly effective 
mechanism of law enforcement. Public law, it would seem, is enforceable after 
all. 
Goldsmith and Levinson might argue that, contrary to appearances, the 
Court was not the enforcement body in this case. Nixon did not comply 
because he respected the authority of the Court; rather, he complied because he 
would certainly have been impeached and convicted otherwise. Even assuming 
that this claim about Nixon’s motivations is true, it is hard to see how it 
vindicates Goldsmith and Levinson’s ultimate thesis about the unenforceability 
of public law. For it would simply follow that public law was enforced in this 
instance by the impeachment mechanism. Even if judicial review did not 
enforce public law in this case, the threat of congressional impeachment did! 
Goldsmith and Levinson would, no doubt, reject this inference. Nixon, 
they would point out, did not have to listen to Congress. As President, he was 
the Chief Law Enforcement Officer and Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces. If he refused to vacate the Oval Office following impeachment by the 
House and conviction by the Senate, no one would have physically forced him 
to do so. His leaving would have had to be his own decision: public law can 
only be self-enforced by the President, not enforced against him by the Court, 
Congress or anyone else. 
 
68.  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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It is hard to know, of course, whether Nixon would have been physically 
forced to leave the Oval Office if he were impeached, convicted and refused to 
budge. But the outcome of the hypothetical is irrelevant to the issue of whether 
impeachment was an effective method of public law enforcement in United 
States v. Nixon. For refusing to leave the Oval Office following impeachment 
and conviction would have had terrible consequences for Nixon, far worse than 
relinquishing the reins of power. The dishonor and public scorn that would 
have been heaped on him for precipitating a constitutional crisis would have 
been more than he was willing to bear. The threat of impeachment, therefore, 
was genuinely coercive: it compelled Nixon to comply with the Court because 
the costs of playing hardball were simply too great. 
Goldsmith and Levinson are wrong, therefore, to claim that public law 
cannot be enforced. As we have seen, impeachment and judicial review can be 
effective tools for disciplining state actors. Indeed, they are not the only 
options available. Public law can be enforced at the ballot box: state actors who 
violate the law can be voted out of office. Others can be fired, fined, or 
denounced by their superiors. Funding denials are also powerful enforcement 
tools. Agencies or governmental subdivisions that refuse to follow the law may 
see their budgets shrink dramatically. 
We can now see that there is a missing premise in Goldsmith and 
Levinson’s argument. Recall the passage cited earlier: “Lacking the kind of 
‘external’ enforcement mechanism that states provide for ordinary domestic 
law, public law regimes must be internally self-enforcing.”69 Even if public law 
cannot be enforced in the same way as ordinary domestic law, it does not 
follow that public law cannot be enforced at all. It would follow only if law 
enforcement had to take the form that it does in ordinary domestic law, 
namely, internalized physical coercion. In other words, Goldsmith and 
Levinson can establish the unenforceability of public law only by severely 
limiting the kinds of coercive actions that count as law enforcement. The 
reason they do not countenance judicial review, impeachment, elections, 
firings, and defunding as mechanisms of law enforcement, despite being 
coercive, is that they are not physically coercive. 
There is an irony here. The third attempt to rescue international law relies 
on Goldsmith and Levinson’s argument that domestic public law is 
unenforceable. Since enforcement is not necessary for domestic public law, it 
must not be necessary for all other forms of public law, including international 
law. But this argument follows only if we tacitly accept the Modern State 
Conception’s narrow understanding of law enforcement. This effort to 
 
69.  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
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undermine the Enforcement Thesis thus unwittingly relies on the Internalized 
Violence Thesis. 
The third attack on the Enforcement Thesis, therefore, ultimately depends 
on the validity of the Internalized Violence Thesis. Unfortunately, we do not 
know whether the latter is true. And if we cannot establish its truth, we cannot 
use it to falsify the Enforcement Thesis and, with it, the Modern State 
Objection. Indeed, there are strong reasons to reject the Internalized Violence 
Thesis. As we will see in the next Part, this understanding of law enforcement 
is far too narrow. Not only does the Internalized Violence Thesis fail to capture 
the way in which public law is enforced, it does not even comport with the way 
in which ordinary domestic law has been enforced in other legal systems. And 
if the Internalized Violence Thesis is not even true of ordinary domestic law, 
we have no reason to accept it at all. 
Fortunately, we will also see that once the Internalized Violence Thesis is 
rejected, a new defense of international law becomes available. For when we 
broaden our understanding of how law can be enforced, we will find that 
international law fits this expanded definition. International law might not be 
enforced through internalized violence, but it manages to enforce its rules 
nonetheless. 
i i i .  law without police 
The appeal of the Modern State Conception is obvious. Every modern 
domestic legal system has police, prosecutors, and prisons. They are the most 
visible symbols of the law and its tremendous power. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to imagine a modern state maintaining control over its territory 
without bureaucratic organizations that employ the threat and exercise of 
physical force. Nevertheless, we argue that legal systems are possible even in 
the absence of these organizations. As we will see, many legal regimes have 
existed without police forces, prosecutors, or prisons. The Modern State 
Conception cannot be valid for the simple reason that it cannot account for the 
existence of these legal regimes. 
The fact that certain legal systems have governed without the use of 
physical force, however, does not mean that they are the real-world analogues 
of the philosopher’s society of angels. Quite the contrary, these regimes 
enforced their rules and did so quite ruthlessly. As we will see, these systems 
typically externalized the enforcement of the rules to non-regime members. 
They relied on these outside parties either to use physical force against the 
disobedient or to deny the deviants the benefits of communal belonging and 
social cooperation. 
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In this Part, we will briefly discuss two premodern legal systems: medieval 
Icelandic law and canon law. These systems existed for centuries without police 
or other force-backed bureaucratic organizations. Despite lacking the trappings 
of the modern state, these systems managed to develop effective enforcement 
mechanisms through the liberal use of externalization and outcasting. 
Of course, we do not intend to provide detailed descriptions of these legal 
regimes in this Article. We hope to provide just enough information about 
these systems to achieve two limited objectives. First, we will attempt to 
persuade the reader that medieval Iceland and the Catholic Church had actual 
legal systems. In the case of medieval Iceland, we will sketch its history and 
constitutional structure to demonstrate that the country had a legislature and a 
court system for several hundred years. In the case of the Catholic Church, we 
assume that many know that it had (and still has) legislative institutions (the 
papacy, episcopal councils, the College of Cardinals) and will not bother to 
describe them. We will rather dwell on the lesser-known fact that the Church 
had a complex system of courts, much of which persists to the present day. 
Our second aim in this Part will be to describe these systems’ enforcement 
mechanisms. In the case of Iceland, we will discuss the institution of outlawry, 
and, in canon law, the sanction of excommunication. We will see the 
innovative ways in which these premodern legal systems were able to enforce 
their law. Once we appreciate that internalized violence is not the only way to 
enforce ordinary domestic law, we will have reason to reject the Modern State 
Conception of law and with it its challenge to international law.70 This will 
leave us in a position to explore how a fuller vision of law enforcement that 
includes externalization and outcasting—as exemplified by our account of law 
enforcement in medieval Iceland and the canon law—opens up a range of 
possibilities for both domestic and international law enforcement that were 
previously not apparent. 
 
70.  The similarity between international law and medieval Icelandic law has been noted by 
Stanley Anderson, Human Rights and the Structure of International Law, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3-5 (1991). See also Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Collective 
Punishment: A Coordination Account of Legal Order (Univ. of S. Cal., USC Law Legal Studies 
Paper No. 11-9, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786918 (exploring the 
similarity between a number of normative orders including medieval Icelandic law and the 
World Trade Organization). 
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A. Medieval Iceland 71 
Iceland has been described as history’s “first new society.”72 Unlike nearly 
every other premodern polity whose genesis has been long forgotten and is 
otherwise unrecoverable, the founding of Iceland is well documented and 
written records describing the surrounding events survive. According to 
archaeological evidence and extant sources, Iceland was settled between 870 
and 930 primarily by Norwegians, with a minority of Irish and Celts.73 The 
first of these immigrants encountered a virtually, if not entirely, empty 
landmass and within sixty years managed to divvy up the entire island into 
private farms and pasturelands. By the beginning of the next century, Iceland’s 
governmental structure had evolved into the form it would maintain until 
Iceland surrendered and was subordinated to Norway in 1262-64.74  
The reasons for the mass migration to Iceland are not entirely clear. The 
scarcity of land in other Scandinavian countries and colonies, advances in 
shipbuilding technology, improved defenses against Viking invasions in other 
parts of the Atlantic world, and a sense of adventure are among the reasons 
frequently cited by historians.75 The famous sagas written by the Icelanders pin 
the blame, however, on the oppressive rule of King Harald Finehair of 
Norway.76 According to this native account, Harald imposed taxes on the petty 
landowners of Norway and sought to limit their rights.77 Many of these 
landowners left Norway to escape Harald’s rule and search for freedom. 
The society these immigrants established was remarkably egalitarian: 
Iceland did not have a king, feudal lords, or an aristocracy. Regional leaders, 
called chieftains or godi, had little executive power and did not rule within their 
 
71.  For the Icelandic terms in this Section, we follow the anglicizations adopted in WILLIAM IAN 
MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 
(1990). For Miller’s explanation of his spellings, see id. at xi. 
72.  See RICHARD F. TOMASSON, ICELAND: THE FIRST NEW SOCIETY (1980). 
73.  GUNNAR KARLSSON, THE HISTORY OF ICELAND 12-15 (2000). Karlsson’s chronology comes 
from The Book of Settlements, authored in the twelfth century by the priest Ari Porgilsson, 
which is considered one of the principal sources for the settlement. Id. at 11. 
74.  See MILLER, supra note 71, at 16-17. 
75.  Id. at 14. 
76.  Id. at 13-14; see also KARLSSON, supra note 73, at 15 (“In the Book of Settlements the most 
common cause of the emigration of individual settlers is the aggression of the king of 
Norway, Haraldr Fairhair.”). 
77.  JESSE L. BYOCK, MEDIEVAL ICELAND: SOCIETY, SAGAS, AND POWER 53-54 (1988). 
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territory.78 Farmers were free to choose the chieftains they wished to support 
and were permitted to switch alliances each year.79 And while social divisions 
existed between chieftains and farmers, the landed and the landless, and 
freemen and slaves, the class hierarchy was considerably flatter than the 
complex stratification of Norwegian society and other European nations. 
In keeping with their egalitarian culture, the settlers governed themselves 
via assemblies, or Things, that they set up almost immediately upon arriving in 
the country. These Things were governed by established procedures and met at 
regular intervals at predetermined locations.80 The most important of these 
assemblies met each spring to hear lawsuits and resolve administrative issues.81 
This spring assembly, known as the varthing, was formally divided into two 
parts: courts of prosecution and panels for handling debts.82 Each Thing was 
presided over by three chieftains who selected the judges—which functioned 
more like our juries83—that would hear each case.84 
In addition to these local assemblies, a national assembly, called the 
Allthing, was instituted in 930.85 The Allthing met once a year in June, when 
the travel was least burdensome,86 and functioned as a national court system 
and legislature. 
The courts convened at the Allthing were called Quarter Courts, each of 
which represented a quarter of the country.87 Quarter Courts had original 
 
78.  Chieftains were local leaders who likely had both religious and secular tasks. KARLSSON, 
supra note 73, at 24-26. Chieftains also constituted an important part of local organization. 
Every household had to declare itself to be “in Thing” with—which essentially meant in 
alliance with—a chieftain, and once so allied, members of the household were known as that 
chieftain’s “thingmen.” The head of the household chose the allegiance for all of his 
household members. See MILLER, supra note 71, at 17. Thingmen were required to attend the 
Things presided over by their chieftains. See JESSE BYOCK, VIKING AGE ICELAND 171 (2001). 
79.  BYOCK, supra note 77, at 120. 
80.  Id. at 59. 
81.  Id. at 60. 
82.  See BYOCK, supra note 78, at 171. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  According to the traditional account, Ulfljotur was sent back to Eastern Norway around 927 
to study the law of the gulathing. On the basis of this study, he compiled and brought back 
a new law code. This code was adopted in 930 as the law of the land by the community of 
settlers. TOMASSON, supra note 72, at 15. 
86.  BYOCK, supra note 77, at 61. 
87.  KARLSSON, supra note 73, at 22. The Quarter system was instituted in the 960s. See id. at 24. 
The Quarters were comprised of three local Things, except for the North, which 
encompassed four Things. MILLER, supra note 71, at 18. 
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jurisdiction over cases that arose between litigants from different Things and 
appellate jurisdiction over cases that had not been resolved at the local 
Things.88 They also provided litigants with a choice of forum in serious cases: 
when anything more than a three-mark fine was at stake,89 the plaintiff could 
choose to litigate either in his local Thing or in the Quarter Court.90 Cases that 
did not reach resolution at the Quarter Courts could be finally resolved at the 
Fifth Court, which also met at the Allthing. In addition to resolving these 
divided cases, the Fifth Court had original jurisdiction over certain serious 
crimes.91 
The Allthing was not only the site of the Quarter and Fifth Courts, but also 
of the Logretta, the nationwide legislative council that reviewed old laws, 
created new ones, granted certain exceptions from the law, and made treaties.92 
The Logretta was comprised of chieftains from the local Things.93 Together, 
the laws crafted at the Logretta formed the Gragas, the Icelandic code, which 
was applied by the courts at the Allthing and by the local district Things. 
Presiding over the Logretta was Iceland’s only significant national officer: 
the Lawspeaker.94 His role, however, carried little or no official power.95 The 
Lawspeaker’s job was to recite one-third of the nation’s laws by memory 
annually at a national monument known as the Law Rock around which the 
Allthing convened,96 and also to announce any new legislation enacted at the 
Logretta.97 
Scholars of this period of Icelandic law emphasize the Allthing’s 
significance as constitutive of a unified legal system for Iceland—not merely 
because of the national legal bodies that convened there, but because of its 
symbolic power. As Jesse Byock writes, “The Althing system made Iceland into 
one legal community: it was a maximal group which had the obligation to end 
 
88.  BYOCK, supra note 77, at 65. 
89.  Other more serious forms of punishment will be discussed at length in this Section. 
90.  See MILLER, supra note 71, at 17. 
91.  Id. at 18. 
92.  See BYOCK, supra note 78, at 174-75. 
93.  BYOCK, supra note 77, at 61.  
94.  BYOCK, supra note 78, at 175. 
95.  On this point, Byock elaborates, “[a]lthough the position of the law-speaker was 
prestigious, it brought little or no official power to its holder, who was allowed to take sides 
and to participate in litigation and in feuds as a private citizen.” Id. 
96.  See MILLER, supra note 71, at 227. It is not clear to what extent the Lawspeaker decided which 
laws to recite, nor is it clear whether there was any special significance to the selection. 
BYOCK, supra note 78, at 175-76. 
97.  BYOCK, supra note 78, at 175.  
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fighting by peaceful settlement and the machinery to arrange such 
resolutions.”98 
While Iceland had a well-developed legislative and judicial system, it had 
no executive institutions. It had no army, fire department, tax collectors, or 
social workers. In particular, it had no law enforcement personnel. No officials 
were charged with preventing criminal acts, prosecuting those that did occur, 
enforcing court rulings, or executing sentences.99 
Because Iceland had no public prosecutors, victims who were wronged and 
wished redress from the courts had to take the legal initiative themselves: they 
had to commence a prosecution by suing the accused wrongdoer in the 
appropriate judicial forum.100 If the victim/prosecutor was successful, the court 
would declare the defendant guilty and subject to one of three penalties. Petty 
offenses were punished by a three-mark fine.101 More serious offenders were 
subject to “outlawry.”102 Someone declared an “outlaw” was cast outside the 
law: they lost the rights normally accorded members of the Icelandic 
community, such as the rights to reside in Iceland, to hospitality, and to own 
property.103 
Icelandic law provided for two forms of outlawry. In “lesser” outlawry, the 
outlaw was banished from the country for three years.104 His property was 
 
98.  BYOCK, supra note 78, at 181; see also MILLER, supra note 71, at 21 (“Political and jural unity 
was achieved by the symbolic load borne by the Allthing and the law that was recited 
there.”). 
99.  See, e.g., KARLSSON, supra note 73, at 21, 24. 
100.  See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 71, at 227-28. 
101.  Id. at 223. In addition to prosecution, victims could either engage in self-help by 
initiating/continuing feuds or seek settlements via private arbitration. Id. at 7-8. We assume 
in our discussion that neither feuding nor settling is a form of law enforcement. While the 
law’s permitting feuds and settlements might indicate that the law used these private actions 
as means to enforce its rules, this inference should be resisted. As we will discuss later on, 
successful prosecutors were accorded greater rights than feuders. See infra text 
accompanying note 110. This strongly suggests that the law preferred the former to the 
latter and privileged prosecution as a method for imposing penalties on wrongdoers. In the 
case of settlement, the formal law actually forbade arbitration in cases of killing or serious 
injury absent permission by the Logretta. Though the sagas suggest that these limitations 
were not heeded, “legal experts[] were willing to claim a priority for formal legal resolution 
over purely private settlement.” Id. at 262. 
102.  MILLER, supra note 71, at 224. 
103.  LAWS OF EARLY ICELAND (Gragas I) 7-8 (Andrew Dennis, Peter Foote & Richard Perkins 
trans., 1980). 
104.  See BYOCK, supra note 77, at 231. 
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confiscated and a portion of it was awarded to the plaintiff.105 In the “full” 
version, the outlaw was exiled for life. Furthermore, he was denied legal 
personality and was treated as though he were dead. Not only could his 
property be confiscated, but he also could be killed with impunity.106 
Using the terminology introduced in the previous Part, we can describe the 
norms levying fines and declaring outlawry as Iceland’s primary enforcement 
rules. They imposed duties on the losing defendant to engage in certain costly 
activities, i.e., to pay a fine or to leave the country. It stands to question, then, 
how the primary enforcement rules were themselves enforced, given that 
Icelandic law did not possess executive institutions. Put bluntly, why did losing 
defendants pay their fines and leave the country if there were no sheriffs 
forcing them to do so? 
In part, defendants complied with the primary enforcement rules because 
the rules were deemed legitimate.107 To disobey a court judgment would have 
brought dishonor upon oneself and eroded one’s standing and support within 
the community. But there was another motivation for complying with the 
sanctions imposed by the law: failure to do so—to engage in so-called 
“judgment breaking”—led to an escalation in penalties. In the case of fines, 
Icelandic law provided that those who did not pay the three marks were subject 
to lesser outlawry. Lesser outlaws who did not leave the country were in turn 
subject to full outlawry.108 
Icelandic legal rules, therefore, formed enforcement chains. The primary 
enforcement rules imposing fines were backed by other primary enforcement 
rules imposing lesser outlawry. And the primary enforcement rules imposing 
 
105.  See MILLER, supra note 71, at 235. Property was confiscated from an outlaw in a ceremony 
held at the defendant’s home known as a féránsdómr. Id. First, the outlaw’s wife’s property 
was set aside, and then all creditors’ claims were paid. One half of the remaining assets was 
awarded to the defendant, and the other half to the men of either the Quarter or the district 
for the maintenance of the outlaw’s dependent or, if the outlaw had no dependents, then to 
needy members of the community. Id. 
106.  See BYOCK, supra note 77, at 231-32. 
107.  On the legitimacy of the law in Iceland, see MILLER, supra note 71, at 229 (“[I]t seems that 
people felt that law promoted order, not just the systemic order derived from the 
assignment of things to a place in a legal and social structure, but actual peace. The 
sentiment is captured in the Norse proverb invoked by Njal: ‘With laws shall our land be 
built, but with disorder laid waste.’” (quoting NJÁLA 70:172 (William Ian Miller trans.) (c. 
13th century))). 
108.  BYOCK, supra note 77, at 231; see also LAWS OF EARLY ICELAND, supra note 103 at 38, 92 (noting 
that lesser outlaws would become full outlaws if they did not pay the prescribed penalty to 
the confiscation court); LAWS OF EARLY ICELAND (Gragas II) 107-08, 383 (Andrew Dennis, 
Peter Foote & Richard Perkins trans., 2000) (describing increasing penalties for judgment 
breaking).  
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lesser outlawry were backed by additional primary enforcement rules imposing 
full outlawry. 
Icelandic law not only bolstered its enforcement rules with an escalating 
schedule of penalties; it outsourced that enforcement by relying on members of 
the community to enforce the law through violence and outcasting.109 The loss 
of rights for a full outlaw, for example, amounted to a death sentence. The full 
outlaw could be killed with impunity, and indeed, the prosecutor of the case 
was obliged to kill him.110 Other outlaws were even incentivized to do this 
killing themselves, since an outlaw could earn full reprieve from his sentence 
by killing three outlaws.111 Moreover, any assistance granted to an outlaw was 
itself punishable; no one was allowed to harbor an outlaw or help him to leave 
the country lest he be subject to outlawry himself.112 Icelandic law, in other 
words, contained secondary enforcement rules. It imposed a duty on those 
other than the conduct rule violator either to kill the conduct rule violators or 
not to assist them. 
Iceland’s system of law enforcement was not perfect. It was not used one 
hundred percent of the time, and parties sometimes opted to engage in private 
feuds rather than bringing their cases to the courts.113 However, Iceland’s legal 
system provided numerous incentives for formally prosecuting cases rather 
than feuding. A victor in the courts gained the offender’s assets, and killing an 
outlaw was far less dangerous than blood revenge since the law’s legitimacy 
made it easier to garner support and isolate the convicted outlaw.114 Plus, 
killing an outlaw would not subject the prosecutor to any legal action 
 
109.  Miller articulates externalized law enforcement in Iceland in terms of the lack of state 
monopoly on violence: 
In Iceland, the violence of the law was not something removed from the general 
populace. There were no state apparatus to pretend to monopolize the legitimate 
use of force. Violence did not take place behind prison walls, there was no sheriff 
to issue a summons to a hostile party, to keep the peace in the court, or to execute 
judgment. It was up to free adult males to do the work of law.  
MILLER, supra note 71, at 232. 
110.  See BYOCK, supra note 77, at 231-32; MILLER, supra note 71, at 234. 
111.  See MILLER, supra note 71, at 239. 
112.  See id. at 234, 238. 
113.  See, e.g., Peter Dinunzio et al., Karl N. Llewellyn: How Icelandic Saga Literature Influenced the 
Scholarship and Life of an American Legal Realist, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1923, 1936 (2007) (“Parties 
were free to abandon the proceedings at anytime and engage in bloody attacks against the 
opposing party. As a result, the specter of violence loomed at every stage of a lawsuit . . . .”). 
114.  See MILLER, supra note 71, at 239. 
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himself.115 As a result, as William Miller describes, “any feud[] was likely at 
some time to find itself in a phase which employed legal process. . . . 
[E]ventually the dispute got to law.”116 
As we can see, the fact that Iceland did not have police, public prosecutors, 
or prisons did not mean that Icelandic law was not enforced. Those who broke 
the law were subject to sanctions for their offenses. Depending on the 
violation, primary enforcement rules required the violator to pay a fine or go 
into exile. Icelandic law also contained an escalating schedule of sanctions for 
those who failed to abide by the initial penalties. Finally, Icelandic law 
contained secondary rules for dealing with those who refused to obey the 
primary enforcement rules. Thus, Icelanders were forbidden to assist or harbor 
an outlaw and were permitted to confiscate their property and, in the case of 
full outlawry, to take their life. 
Unlike modern states that have professional bureaucracies, Icelandic law 
externalized enforcement on to private parties. Moreover, it did so primarily, 
though not exclusively, through the technique of outcasting. Outlawry treated 
the lawbreaker as a social outcast: it denied him the benefits of social 
cooperation and membership. Thus, it imposed a duty on the outlaw to leave 
the country and prohibited others from according him hospitality or assistance 
in any way. It also released others from respecting the outlaw’s property rights. 
It should not be surprising that, in the context of Iceland, social exclusion 
would be a powerful tool of law enforcement. Given the harsh environment 
and scarce resources, Icelanders had difficulty surviving on their own. 
Exclusion from social life made life intolerable for most inhabitants: losing 
one’s property and the assistance of one’s neighbors was a compelling enough 
reason to take the law seriously.117 
B. Classical Canon Law 
Iceland is not the only regime to have had a legal system despite not 
possessing police or other law-enforcement personnel. In fact, the canon law of 
the Roman Catholic Church—perhaps the longest surviving legal system in 
 
115.  Id. at 238-39. 
116.  Id. at 238. 
117.  Though violence could be used against offenders, it was nevertheless a precarious 
enforcement mechanism. Attempting to kill another person, after all, is a dangerous activity 
and most people were not eager to try. See id. at 211. 
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history118—is similar to medieval Iceland in this regard: it managed to have a 
legal regime, and enforce its law, despite the absence of internal coercive 
institutions. 
In this Section, we will briefly describe the medieval canon law regime. 
Fortunately, the burden of exposition here is considerably lighter because of 
the greater familiarity of the subject matter. In contrast to the medieval 
Icelandic commonwealth, most readers know a good deal about the history and 
structure of the Catholic Church. They know that the Catholic Church has 
legislative officials and institutions such as the pope, the College of Cardinals, 
bishops, Vatican councils, and so on. They know that these individuals and 
bodies create many rules, such as those relating to holy days, sacraments, 
sexual conduct, family structure, ordination of clergy, heresy and so on, and 
prescribe sanctions for their violation. 
What they might not know, however, is that the Catholic Church has, and 
has had, a very complex court system. We will begin, then, by describing this 
court system as it existed at the height of canon law, during the so-called 
“classical period.”119 We will see that classical canon law constituted a genuine 
 
118.  While there is uncertainty about when exactly the canon law first constituted what could be 
considered a cohesive “legal system,” most scholars assert that by the second or third 
century, the church had developed a structure of episcopal courts with sufficient hierarchical 
authority to discipline recalcitrant members. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL 
CANON LAW 7-9 (1995) (noting how Constantine I’s acceptance of the Christian church 
coincided with more regular meetings of church councils and synodal assemblies, which 
aided in the development of an ecclesiastical organizational structure and a more clearly 
enunciated authority for bishops over their congregants); ELISABETH VODOLA, 
EXCOMMUNICATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 7 (1986) (noting that although “[l]ittle is known 
of early ecclesiastical institutions,” hierarchical institutions existed by the second century 
and episcopal courts had disciplinary authority by the third century). This system of rules, 
first created and enforced over 1700 years ago, continues to be used today. See, e.g., R. H. 
HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 1 (1996) (noting that large sections of 
canon law were still in force in nineteenth-century England, that many canon law rules have 
taken root in modern English and American law, and that courts of the Catholic Church still 
use this legal regime). 
119.  Most scholars mark the beginning of the “classical period” at some point in the twelfth 
century, with the development of a progressively more complex and centralized legal regime 
that the Church applied with greater uniformity. For a full discussion of the beginnings of 
the classical period, see, for example, CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE 
TWELFTH CENTURY (1927), which describes the intellectual reinvigoration that marked this 
period; HELMHOLZ, supra note 118; and JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE PROFESSION AND 
PRACTICE OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 26-63 (1988). Marking the “end” of the classical period 
of canon law is more difficult. Most scholars mark 1234 as the end of the period of 
prominence for Gratian’s Decretum, a date which coincides with the decision of Pope 
Gregory IX to send his own decretals to the preeminent universities in Bologna and Paris 
and marks a time of transition when the classical canon law developed into a broader legal 
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legal system, for it not only possessed legislative institutions but a 
sophisticated structure of adjudicative ones as well. 
Canon lawyers normally mark the beginning of the classical period at 1140 
with the publication of Gratian’s Decretum.120 In this book, Gratian sought to 
synthesize and harmonize the conflicting mass of canon rules derived from 
disparate sources, such as scripture, papal decisions, church councils, and the 
sayings of church fathers. The Decretum quickly became the principal canon 
law textbook in the newly founded law schools throughout Europe and 
stimulated a surge in legal scholarship devoted to explaining the various 
doctrines of Gratian.121 
In general, law begets law, and canon law is no exception. One of the great 
accomplishments of Gratian’s textbook was to demonstrate how abstract 
principles of canon law could be used to resolve apparent conflicts between 
rules and how these rules could then be used to answer concrete questions.122 
 
tradition referred to as the ius commune. See generally ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF 
GRATIAN’S DECRETUM (2007) (examining the original version of the Decretum and the legal 
and intellectual developments surrounding its creation); Kenneth Pennington, The 
Decretalists 1190 to 1234, in THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD, 
1140-1234: FROM GRATIAN TO THE DECRETALS OF POPE GREGORY IX, at 211, 245 (Wilfried 
Hartmann & Kenneth Pennington eds., 2008) [hereinafter THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL 
CANON LAW]. Yet the end of Gratian’s prominence is not generally considered to be when 
the classical period also ended. Indeed, the Code of Canon Law that existed in the time of 
Gratian was only significantly reformed with the promulgation of a new code in 1917. Prior 
to 1917, the most significant reform of canon law—impelled by the Protestant 
Reformation—occurred with the Council of Trent, which met from 1562-63 and 
significantly amended, clarified, and added new doctrine to the corpus of canon law that had 
existed in 1140. See generally JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 10, 15-20 
(rev. ed. 2004) (discussing what Coriden identifies as the seven different periods in the 
development of canon law and marking the difference between the classical period and a 
period of decline and reform as beginning around the time of the Protestant Reformation). 
120.  See BRUNDAGE, supra note 118, at 48. While the date of composition and first appearance of 
the Decretum is uncertain, it is customary to consider its first publication in 1140. 
HELMHOLZ, supra note 118, at 7. For a detailed description of the writing of the Decretum and 
a full discussion of both the revisions of the document and the important additions made to 
Gratian’s work, see, for example, Michael H. Hoeflich & Jasonne M. Grabher, The 
Establishment of Normative Legal Texts: The Beginnings of the Ius Commune, in THE HISTORY 
OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW, supra note 119, at 1, 1-21. 
121.  For a full discussion of the Decretum’s influence on classical canon law, see, for example, 
James A. Brundage, The Teaching and Study of Canon Law in the Law Schools, in THE 
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW, supra note 119, at 98, 98-120, which describes the 
growth in complexity of the canon law as a result of Gratian and the coinciding growth in 
law schools with scholars dedicated specifically to the study of canon law; and HELMHOLZ, 
supra note 118, at 7-10. 
122.  BRUNDAGE, supra note 118, at 48. 
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This increase in legal knowledge led to an increase in litigation, which in turn 
generated a considerable amount of new law.123 
The growth in legislation and litigation created tremendous pressure for 
the institutional reform of ecclesiastical courts. Before the classical period, 
adjudication was mainly an ad hoc affair. At the local level, bishops and 
archdeacons decided cases in the normal course of their official duties and did 
so without a cadre of trained personnel. Bishops who faced particularly 
difficult legal questions could call a “synod,” a general assembly of clergy from 
the region. During these meetings, legal problems would be discussed and the 
members would advise the bishop on how to rule.124 
By the close of the twelfth century, however, bishops and synods could no 
longer keep up with the rising caseloads and responded by delegating judicial 
responsibilities to legally trained judges. These judges were often called the 
“bishop’s officials,” and chief judges the “officials-principal.”125 By the latter 
half of the thirteenth century, many of these officials-principal presided over 
complex judicial bureaucracies. In addition to a staff of clerks who produced 
and copied documents, registrars who maintained the docket, and bailiffs who 
notified parties about their appearances, subordinate judges would often 
examine witnesses and try cases delegated by the official-principal. Because this 
court was a standing judicial forum, it became known as the bishop’s 
“consistory court.” Consistory courts were distinguished from those at which 
the bishop himself presided. These latter courts were known as “courts of 
audience.”126 
Above the bishop consistory courts and courts of audience were the 
provincial courts. Archbishops established provincial courts to hear appeals 
coming from below as well as exercising original jurisdiction over particularly 
weighty matters.127 At the top of the judicial hierarchy, of course, was the pope 
 
123.  See id. at 44-54. 
124.  Id. at 120. 
125.  Id. at 121-22. 
126.  For further discussion of the development of the episcopal court system in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, see id. Lesser prelates, such as archdeacons, also developed courts of 
their own. These courts concerned themselves with minor disputes not sufficiently 
important to warrant episcopal attention and with the enforcement of disciplinary rules of 
the Church. Thus, these lesser courts punished sexual misbehavior, drunkenness, violations 
of the Sabbath, and so on. Archdeacons, too, responded to the rising tide of litigation by 
delegating their judicial responsibilities to trained legal professionals to adjudicate cases that 
would ordinarily come before them. For a full discussion of the powers and responsibilities 
of different classes of clerics, see id. at 122-23. 
127.  Id. at 123. 
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and his curia in Rome. The pope claimed both original and appellate 
jurisdiction over all matters that arose within the entirety of western 
Christendom.128 
By the late twelfth century, popes began to appoint trained legal 
professionals to the College of Cardinals who would advise them when hearing 
cases. The resulting judicial body became known as the “Roman consistory.”129 
The pope and cardinals met daily in consistory to hear arguments and appeals 
and then to deliberate about the proper outcome in each case. This system 
ultimately proved unworkable, given the crushing demands of other papal 
responsibilities.130 As a result, the pope delegated all but the most important 
cases to general hearing officers known as “auditors-general.” Because the 
auditors-general heard cases in a round courtroom, taking turns presiding, the 
court was nicknamed “the Wheel.”131 To this very day, the pope uses the Wheel 
as the main tribunal of justice.132 
The increased complexity of the system of adjudicating canon law was in 
many respects due to the increasing sophistication of the lawyers trained to 
handle such cases. Scholars such as James Brundage celebrate this 
accomplishment as the greatest triumph of classical canon law, a system that 
was as much about ferreting out and condemning heretics as it was about 
establishing uniform inheritance and land title rights between sophisticated 
actors. Moreover, because of the increased sophistication of the canon law bar, 
the Church was able to engage in a form of legal regime arbitrage: litigants 
went to ecclesiastical courts—instead of local ones—because the courts, stocked 
with well-prepared graduates of elite canon law universities, offered more 
efficient and effective services than those offered locally.133 
Tomes, of course, could be written about the ecclesiastical courts during 
the classical period. Our aim here is only to sketch the basic structure of the 
ecclesiastical courts so as to give the reader a reason to believe that canon law 
 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. at 124. 
130.  Id. at 123-25. 
131.  Id. at 125. 
132.  For a full discussion of papal oversight of issues arising in canon law, see id. at 124-26. 
133.  See BRUNDAGE, supra note 119, at 30-35 (describing what the author identifies as four 
separate stages in the professionalization of canon lawyers and explaining how with this 
increasing professionalization, a canon lawyer’s caseload became larger and often more 
complex); see also VODOLA, supra note 118, at 35 (“In another way, too, canon law had 
become more concerned with law and legal practice . . . university training in jurisprudence, 
and especially study of the Corpus iuris civilis, had intensified the canonists’ focus on purely 
juristic themes . . . .”). 
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was an actual legal system. Church canons were not simply the rules of an 
organized religion—they were laws of a living, breathing legal regime. They 
were created by legislative processes and applied by a hierarchical and complex 
system of duly constituted courts. 
Having attempted to show that classical canon law was a genuine legal 
system, we will now explore the ways in which the Catholic Church enforced 
its rules. To do so, we begin with the debate among canon lawyers about 
whether the Church was permitted to use “temporal” sanctions, such as 
monetary fines, corporal punishment, and the death penalty. Initially, many 
argued that the Church ought to remain in the higher realm and eschew 
physical coercion. Punishments should be limited to spiritual sanctions: prayer, 
fasting, public displays of contrition, and so on. Gratian quotes the Bible to 
support this point: “resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right 
cheek, turn to him the other also.”134 Gratian does, however, collect authorities 
justifying the use of force. Augustine, for example, argued that such counsels of 
patience were meant to soften the hearts of good people. If one applied such 
maxims to bad people, one would be giving them license to commit evil. 
Augustine also argued that inflicting force—even deadly force—to turn 
someone away from evil is actually more charitable than letting them persist in 
sin. Even execution is far better than eternal damnation.135 
The canonists tried to harmonize these opposing viewpoints in the 
following way. First and foremost, they held that the Church was forbidden 
from directly inflicting most types of physical punishment. In particular, the 
death penalty could never be directly imposed by the church. Nevertheless, the 
Church could seek the death penalty through the proper secular authorities, 
though only in the interest of justice and only when there was no longer any 
reasonable hope the criminals would amend their ways.136 
Canon law did permit bishops to keep armed personnel in their retinue and 
to threaten physical force in order to enforce their judgments. However, it 
emphatically prohibited them from following through on their threats if the 
person subject to the punishment resisted. Bishops had only two main choices 
 
134.  Matthew 5:39 (King James); see also HELMHOLZ, supra note 118, at 339-40, 344 (documenting 
the general discussion amongst ecclesiastical officials over the use of temporal sanctions and 
citing Gratian’s Decretum); VODOLA, supra note 118, at 2-12 (noting other sources of 
ecclesiastical and biblical authority authorizing excommunication). 
135.  HELMHOLZ, supra note 118, at 345-47. 
136.  Id. at 348. 
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for dealing with contumacy: excommunication or recourse to secular 
authorities to impose temporal sanctions.137 Let us discuss each option in turn. 
Excommunication came in two basic forms, minor and major. Minor 
excommunication entailed separation of the person from the sacraments of the 
Church. Thus, the excommunicated could not receive the Eucharist, go to 
confession, be married, and so on. Nor could they hold ecclesiastical office or 
participate in the liturgy in a ministerial capacity (though they were permitted 
to attend mass). Major excommunication entailed a complete separation from 
the Christian community. Those subject to major excommunication were 
shunned from their neighbors; no one was permitted to talk, eat, or do 
business with them.138 
Because excommunication was the most serious sanction the Church could 
impose on those who disobeyed its rules—the glossa ordinaria to the Decretals 
called it “the eternal separation of death”139—the Church imposed strict 
requirements on its use. Both major and minor excommunication could be 
imposed only by an authorized episcopal court and only after due process had 
been served.140 Thus, the person would have to have had fair warning, the 
opportunity to defend himself, and the right of appeal to a higher court. 
Sentences of excommunication had to be in writing, where the cause of 
excommunication was clearly set out, and the person excommunicated was 
entitled to a copy.141 
The extreme gravity of excommunication also led canonists to insist that it 
be used only “medicinally.” Excommunication was designed to restore spiritual 
health, not to punish. Thus, if a poor man could not pay his debt, he was not to 
be excommunicated for his failure. Moreover, canon law required that a 
sentence of excommunication be lifted if it was clear that the person 
excommunicated had no intention of complying with the court’s original 
order.142 
 
137.  For a full discussion of how and when Church figures could use temporal power, see id. at 
344-48. 
138.  For a general discussion of major and minor excommunication, see id. at 370-84. 
139.  Id. at 375. 
140.  Persons could only be excommunicated by judicial superiors. Id. at 376. Thus, bishops could 
not be excommunicated by bishops but only by archbishops or higher. 
141.  Id. at 376. 
142.  For a discussion of the overriding “medicinal” purpose of excommunication, see id. at 376-
78. See also id. at 377 (quoting Joannes Andreae, a fourteenth-century legal scholar, as stating 
that “the prelate, as a doctor, who sees that the medicine of excommunication, even if justly 
imposed, is not helpful but rather detrimental may discreetly remove it even during 
contumacy, if he sees that this will be useful to the health of the person excommunicated”). 
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In special cases, canon law dispensed with the necessity of adjudication. In 
situations of heresy or violent assault on a cleric, the offender was subject to 
automatic excommunication, known as “excommunication latae sententiae.”143 
In order to circumvent the requirement of due process, canon law promulgated 
the fiction that offenders had been warned in advance that excommunication 
would automatically follow a certain offense and thus they had fair notice of 
this sanction. Once a person was excommunicated latae sententiae and not in 
danger of dying, only the papal court could grant absolution and lift the 
sanction.144 
If excommunication did not motivate the offender to reform his ways, 
canon law permitted ecclesiastical courts to refer the matter to the secular 
authorities. In the terminology of canon law, the recalcitrant person would be 
“relaxed” to the secular arm for punishment. A lively debate arose among 
canon lawyers as to whether the Church was merely permitted to request that 
secular authorities impose temporal punishment or whether it could demand 
assistance as a matter of right. Canon law eventually settled on the latter 
option. The legitimacy of secular authorities, they claimed, ultimately derived 
from the Church, and thus the government is obligated to heed ecclesiastical 
referrals. Failure on the part of the king to comply with ecclesiastical demands 
could itself be met with a sentence of excommunication.145 
That the Church claimed authority over the secular arm did not mean that 
the secular arm always acquiesced. In France, for example, King Louis IX 
 
143.  Id. at 383-85. 
144.  Id. at 385. Out of concern that those to be excommunicated receive due process, Gratian was 
particularly wary of excommunication latae sententiae, precisely because this form of 
excommunication did not give the excommunicate a judicial avenue to contest the sanction. 
See VODOLA, supra note 118, at 29-30. 
145.  For a full discussion of these two perspectives, see HELMHOLZ, supra note 118, at 350-57. For 
a discussion of the concept of “relaxing” a sinner “to the secular arm,” especially as the 
process applied to early instances of heresy, see Joseph Prud’homme, Dissent and the Death 
Penalty: Developing a Comparative Perspective, in AUGUSTINE AND HISTORY 91, 115 (Christopher 
T. Daly, John Doody & Kim Paffenroth eds., 2008). Helmholz divides these two camps into 
those adopting the Gelasian view and those adhering to a hierocratic perspective. Those 
espousing the former position held that temporal authority and spiritual authority were 
“two jurisdictions [that] were independent but mutually supportive.” HELMHOLZ, supra 
note 118, at 351. In contrast, as Church leaders found it useful to infer a duty on the part of 
the state to aid in effectuating ecclesiastical dictates, they began to promote the hierocratic 
view. As the name implies, this position held that a temporal authority had to enforce the 
mandates of the Church on pain of excommunication. Id. at 352-53. Interestingly, Vodola 
notes a tension in exerting pressure, through excommunication, on leaders who refused to 
follow Church directives, and the need to avoid fanning the flames of anticlerical 
movements, particularly those in France. See VODOLA, supra note 118, at 140, 161-64. 
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refused to respect ecclesiastical referrals on the grounds that doing so would 
lead to grave injustices. The Church was more successful in the German-
speaking lands, where secular authorities were receptive to its entreaties. 
Cooperation between spiritual and secular authorities was strongest in 
England. From the early thirteenth century, the common law granted the 
Church the right to petition the royal courts to impose sanctions that were 
unavailable in ecclesiastical courts. After forty days of excommunication, a 
bishop could submit a petition, called a “significavit,” to the Chancery 
requesting that the recalcitrant offender be imprisoned. Upon receipt of the 
significavit, the Chancery would issue a writ, called a “letter of caption,” 
ordering the sheriff to imprison the offender until he received absolution from 
the Church. Importantly, English courts made no inquiry into the legitimacy of 
the Church’s requests. As long as the significavit was issued by a duly 
constituted episcopal authority, secular authorities would issue letters of 
caption as a matter of course.146 
As this brief sketch indicates, medieval canon law was able to enforce its 
rules despite the fact that it was not authorized to use physical coercion. For 
while it did not have control over the body, the Church claimed power over 
something even more precious: the soul. Canon law, for example, authorized 
ecclesiastical courts to control the expiation of sin. Judges could impose 
spiritual sanctions on the offender requiring certain acts of public penance 
before absolution would be granted. 
If these primary enforcement norms proved ineffective, canon law’s 
secondary enforcement rules permitted courts to excommunicate recalcitrant 
individuals. Through minor excommunication, offenders were denied the 
sacraments of the Church and, as a result, risked eternal damnation.147 In the 
terminology of this Article, minor excommunication is a form of “internalized 
outcasting.” It is internalized in that Church officials were prohibited from 
ministering to the excommunicated individual. It is outcasting because the 
 
146.  For a full discussion of the varying ways temporal authorities enforced excommunication 
regimes, see HELMHOLZ, supra note 118, at 357-59. 
147.  An excommunicate, while excluded from Church rituals or the community itself, was not 
damned merely by nature of the excommunication: such a final determination on the fate of 
one’s soul could only be made by God. See, e.g., R. H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW 
OF ENGLAND 108 (1987) (stating that “earthly excommunication did not represent a final 
determination” given that the sanction was always subject to “reversal by God” and 
“[u]njust sentences were inevitable”). 
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excommunicated were nonviolently denied the benefits of receiving Church 
sacraments. Indeed, “excommunication” means “separated from the community.”148 
By claiming power over the spiritual lives of offenders, the Church was able 
to leverage control over their social lives as well. Through major 
excommunication, the Church could deprive offenders of social interaction and 
thereby cut them off from their communities. Major excommunication, thus, is 
a form of externalized outcasting, because it prohibited the laity from 
associating and cooperating with the offender. 
We have also seen that the Church had yet another enforcement tool in its 
arsenal. Though it denied itself the amenities of a state, the Church had the 
next best thing: access to states that were willing to use physical force. Thus, 
the Church was able to externalize law enforcement by referring the matter to 
secular authorities. While the Church did not dirty its hands by using physical 
force, it was able to see to it that physical forms of coercion would ultimately be 
used against sinners. 
C. Feature or Bug?  
As the cases of medieval Icelandic law and canon law demonstrate, the 
Modern State Conception is both an excessively narrow and historically 
incomplete account of law. Legal systems can and have existed despite lacking 
the capacities of a modern state. Even without police, jails, and professional 
prosecutors, these systems were able to do what legal systems normally do: 
enact legislation by officials who follow formal rules, resolve disputes 
according to preexisting norms by judges following rules of procedure and 
 
148.  Numerous scholars of classical canon law have suggested that the sanction was overused 
and had become less effective by the time of the Reformation. Helmholz, for example, cites 
one late-medieval commentator on canon law as saying that the practice had come to be 
used for trivial purposes and had “wrought confusion in the church.” HELMHOLZ, supra note 
118, at 390. He quotes another French “provincial estate” as saying that excommunication 
was used so indiscriminately that “the greater part of the population was excommunicated.” 
Id. at 391; see also HELMHOLZ, supra note 147, at 102 (noting the common perception that 
excommunication ceased to be effective because its “misuse” caused a “decline in respect for 
the Church and clergy, or with a more general breakdown in societal order”); David C. 
Brown, The Keys of the Kingdom: Excommunication in Colonial Massachusetts, 67 NEW ENG. Q. 
531, 535 (1994) (explaining the Church’s power to separate a sinner from communion with 
other Christians); Rosalind Hill, The Theory and Practice of Excommunication in Medieval 
England, HIST., Feb. 1957, at 11 (arguing that the sanction was overused and had become 
trivialized as a minor inconvenience). While the excessive use of excommunication no doubt 
diminished its effectiveness, this would be true for any sanction, even those administered by 
regimes with internalized enforcement mechanisms. 
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evidence, and enforce legislation and court orders using various forms of 
coercion. 
The Modern State Conception fails, therefore, because of its parochial 
definition of law enforcement. Contrary to the Internalized Violence Thesis, it 
is possible to enforce the law in ways other than how modern states enforce 
ordinary domestic law. Rather than rely on internal enforcement mechanisms, 
legal systems can utilize non-regime members to exercise coercion against 
those who violate the rules. And rather than rely upon the imposition of 
physical force, they can depend instead on nonviolent exclusion from the 
benefits of community. 
As we have seen, Iceland not only externalized its enforcement but used 
both outcasting and violence. It externalized outcasting by requiring outlaws to 
exile themselves and by forbidding others from assisting these outlaws in any 
way. And it externalized violence by requiring the holder of a full outlawry 
judgment to kill the outlaw and by permitting others to do the same. Medieval 
canon law also externalized its outcasting through the technique of major 
excommunication149 and externalized violence through the relaxation of the 
contumacious to the secular arm.150 
At this point, the defenders of the Modern State Conception might concede 
that regimes need not enforce their rules through internalized violence for 
these rules to be law. Rather, they might make a normative claim instead: 
regimes that do not use internalized violence may be legal systems, but they are 
deficient ones. After all, the examples we used to prove our case are premodern, 
medieval systems. Their lack of physically coercive bureaucracies, the argument 
might go, was a serious inadequacy, a problem that was cured only with the 
advent of the modern state. 
Two responses are in order. First, externalization and outcasting are not the 
exclusive province of the medieval world. In our modern system of cooperative 
federalism, the federal government routinely outsources enforcement of federal 
law to the states. States play a critical role in federal environmental, education, 
social welfare, health care, and criminal law.151 The Clean Air Act, for instance, 
seeks to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to 
 
149.  Minor excommunication was a form of internalized outcasting because it was carried out by 
the clergy. 
150.  As mentioned before, relaxation to the secular arm became an option only in certain 
countries and only after the beginning of the thirteenth century. It follows, therefore, that 
neither internalized nor externalized violence is necessary for legality. 
151.  While states play a central enforcement role in federal environmental law, enforcement does 
not fall on states alone. The federal government, through administrative agencies, and 
individual citizens, through citizen suits, contribute to the enforcement effort. 
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promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
population”152 by harnessing the bureaucratic machinery of state governments. 
While the federal government sets the mandate to be enforced, states develop 
implementation plans to bring the federal mandate to fruition. Each state has 
“primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic 
area comprising such State by submitting an implementation plan for such 
State which will specify the manner in which national primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained.”153 
State implementation plans for national primary and secondary ambient air 
quality standards are to “include enforceable emission limitations and other 
control measures, means, or techniques (including economic incentives such as 
fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights), as well as 
schedules and timetables for compliance.”154 In addition to delegating 
enforcement to states, the Clean Air Act places sanctioning authority in 
states.155 States are called upon to “assess and collect a noncompliance penalty 
against every person who owns or operates” any stationary source not in 
compliance with federal emission controls and standards.156 
Modern legal systems also enforce their rules through healthy doses of 
outcasting. As we saw before, domestic public law in the United States is 
enforced through impeachment, elections, job termination, and defunding. 
Rather than arresting the President of the United States for failing to abide by 
the law, the President can be cast out of office through impeachment and 
conviction or defeat in the next election. Federal agencies that fail to execute 
congressional mandates are not sent to the gulag—their budgets get slashed. 
And states that fail to enforce federal law are not normally invaded by the 
United States Army—they simply lose valuable federal dollars and must, as a 
result, cut services or increase taxes. 
There is another reason to reject the idea that systems that lack physically 
coercive bureaucracies are deficient. At least from the perspective of the 
cultures involved, the absence of such power was a feature, not a bug. 
Icelanders considered their outlawry regime to be in keeping with the 
egalitarianism of the Commonwealth. Iceland was special precisely because it 
did not have a king. Similarly, the Church of the classical period was convinced 
 
152.  42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). 
153.  Id. § 7407(a). 
154.  Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A). 
155.  The Clean Air Act vests the Environmental Protection Agency with sanctioning authority as 
well. Id. § 7410(m). 
156.  Id. § 7420(a)(2)(A). 
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that temporal sanctions would sully its spiritual character and mission. Rather 
than being a source of shame, canon law took pride in the distance it kept from 
Caesar. Those who regard such systems as lesser versions of law, therefore, 
betray a modern prejudice: they fail to appreciate that brute power is not 
always to be pursued and that, indeed, its acquisition can be inconsistent with 
the moral ends of a legal system. 
iv.  outcasting and external enforcement in 
international law  
With the blinders imposed by the Modern State Conception removed—and 
a fuller vision of law that includes outcasting and external enforcement as really 
and truly law—international law appears in an entirely new light. We are able 
to see that allowing the Modern State Conception to set the terms of the debate 
over international law leads us to ask and answer the wrong questions. Yes, 
very little of international law meets the Modern State Conception of 
international law—very little (if any) of it is enforced through brute physical 
force deployed by an institution enforcing its own rules. But what is interesting 
is not so much what international law is not, but what it is. And that is law that 
operates almost entirely through outcasting and external enforcement.157 
In this Part, we document how international law works in light of the 
broader understanding of law that we have put forth. What we see is that, time 
and again, international legal institutions use others (usually states) to enforce 
their rules, and they typically deploy outcasting—denying individuals the 
benefits of social cooperation—rather than physical force. The much more 
complete picture of law offered above thus not only gives the lie to the Modern 
State Conception, but also provides a new way of understanding international 
law and how it functions. 
 
157.  Outcasting bears a strong resemblance to Anthony D’Amato’s concept of reciprocal 
entitlement violation. According to D’Amato, international law is enforced by allowing 
victim states to violate the rights of offending states. See D’Amato, supra note 6, at 1310-13. 
There are three main differences, however, between outcasting and reciprocal entitlement 
violation. First, outcasting does not necessarily involve the violation of an entitlement. 
Consider boycotts. By refusing to trade with another, the outcaster declines to exercise her 
own entitlement to trade, rather than violate any of the rights of the outcasted. Second, 
D’Amato conceives of reciprocal entitlement violations as internalized violent enforcement, 
id. at 1313, whereas outcasting is nonviolent and neutral as between internal and external 
enforcement. Third, D’Amato treats reciprocal entitlement violations as permissive and 
first-party countermeasures, id. at 1310-13, whereas outcasting comes in mandatory and 
third-party varieties as well. See infra text accompanying note 181 and text following note 
210.  
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Different international legal regimes can be classified depending on the 
particular modes of enforcement on which they depend. We illustrate this by 
dividing law enforcement into internal and external enforcement, and into that 
which resorts to physical force and that which does not. These two different 
axes can overlap to create four separate categories: (1) internal and physical; (2) 
external and physical; (3) internal and nonphysical; and (4) external and 
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As this diagram makes clear, the Modern State Conception of law 
enforcement is only one part of the larger picture—it encompasses law that is 
enforced through internal systems using physical force. But there are three 
other forms of law enforcement: external physical enforcement (enforced by 
external actors using physical force), internal outcasting (enforced by internal 
actors using nonphysical means), and external outcasting (enforced by external 
actors using nonphysical means). As we described the Modern State 
Conception of law in some depth above, we focus here on completing the 
picture with more detailed descriptions of the other three forms of law 
enforcement. This serves as a prelude to a closer examination in the next Part 
of the type of legal enforcement regime that is most prevalent in international 
law: external outcasting. 
A. External Physical Enforcement  
External physical enforcement operates by externalizing enforcement onto 
other actors that, in turn, resort to physical force. As we noted above, the 
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Modern State Conception demands that enforcement be enforced internally—
that is, by the regime itself. All external legal enforcement (whether physical or 
nonphysical) violates this demand. It instead tasks some party outside the 
regime with ensuring compliance with the rules. Classical canon law, for 
example, provided that the ecclesiastical courts could “relax” a person to 
external actors—the secular authorities—for physical punishment.158 
Nearly all physical enforcement of international law is external physical 
enforcement.159 As noted above,160 a central principle of international law—
codified in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter—is the prohibition on 
the use of aggressive force by a sovereign state against the sovereign territory or 
political independence of another state. Although the original intention was for 
the United Nations to have troops at its disposal to carry out enforcement 
actions,161 in practice such actions have been carried out by states acting with 
the approval of the United Nations Security Council. 
In the Korean War, for example, the Security Council encouraged member 
states to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary 
to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the 
area.”162 Similarly, the first U.S. Gulf War was initiated pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 678, which authorized “Member States co-operating with 
the Government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means . . . to restore 
international peace and security in the area.”163 The resolution “[r]equest[ed] 
all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken” pursuant 
to that authorization and “[r]equest[ed] the States concerned to keep the 
Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken.”164 
In these cases and many others like them, the use of physical force under 
Chapter VII was carried out by actors outside the institutional bureaucracy of 
the United Nations, thus making the use of physical force to enforce the law 
external to the United Nations. 
 
158.  See supra text accompanying note 145. 
159.  For discussion of internal physical enforcement of international law, see supra Section II.A. 
160.  See supra Section II.B. 
161.  Article 43 of the U.N. Charter calls on member states to make “a special agreement or 
agreements” to provide armed forces to the Security Council in order to form a standing 
U.N. army. To date, no member state has signed a special agreement with the United 
Nations. U.N. Charter art. 43. 
162.  S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950). 
163.  S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
164.  Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
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External physical enforcement also occurs through the use of self-defense 
(authorized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter) and, as we argued earlier,165 
through mutual defense treaties authorizing states to come to the aid of one 
another in the event of an attack. States are permitted to use physical force to 
engage in self-defense and collective self-defense to repel an armed attack.166 
Mutual defense treaties enforce this principle of international law by providing 
that if one of the parties to the treaty is attacked, the other will come to its aid, 
thereby enforcing the right of the first state to repel aggression against it. In 
both cases, the use of physical force is external to the treaty organization. 
B. Internal Outcasting  
Internal outcasting occurs when the internal bureaucratic structures of a 
legal system enforce the law without resorting to the threat or use of physical 
force. Internal outcasting meets the internality condition of the Modern State 
Conception—it has at least one secondary enforcement link that is addressed to 
officials of the regime in question. But it does not provide for the use of 
violence—it does not require or permit officials of the regime to use physical 
force to enforce the law. For example, minor excommunication in classical 
canon law entailed separation of a person from the sacraments of the 
Church.167 This penalty relied on enforcement by Church officials (internal to 
the Church) by denying the benefits of membership in the Church (outcasting). 
Internal outcasting is used in international law any time a regime sanctions 
lawbreaking behavior of a state by excluding the state from participation in the 
treaty bodies. The World Health Organization (WHO) offers an example. The 
WHO directs and coordinates a vast array of international public health 
programs aimed at everything from combating infectious diseases (such as 
HIV/AIDS, swine flu, and SARS) to setting health-related norms and 
standards to improving access to clean water.168 State parties have the right to 
appoint delegations to the World Health Assembly, which is the WHO’s 
 
165.  See supra Section II. B. 
166.  Article 51 provides, in part: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51. 
167.  See supra notes 138, 147-148. 
168.  Working for Health: An Introduction to the World Health Organization, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(2007), http://www.who.int/about/brochure_en.pdf. 
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decisionmaking body.169 The Health Assembly elects its President and other 
officers, elects the Executive Board of the WHO (which serves as the executive 
arm of the WHO), adopts its rules of procedure, appoints the WHO Director-
General, and establishes committees necessary for the work of the 
Organization, to name just a few of its enumerated functions.170 The Health 
Assembly also has the authority to adopt health regulations and standards that 
are binding on parties that do not expressly opt out within a specified time 
period.171 
The WHO is supported by mandatory contributions by state parties, as 
well as voluntary donor contributions. The mandatory state party 
contributions are enforced, moreover, by the prospect of internal outcasting. If 
a Member “fails to meet its financial obligations to the Organization . . . the 
Health Assembly may, on such conditions as it thinks proper, suspend the 
voting privileges and services to which a Member is entitled. The Health 
Assembly shall have the authority to restore such voting privileges and 
services.”172 Note that the state party is not ejected from the WHO altogether. 
Instead, the state party loses the ability to participate as a voting member in the 
Health Assembly—and thus loses control over the activities of the WHO that 
the Health Assembly oversees and directs. In other words, the sanction for the 
offense of nonpayment is exclusion from the benefit of participating in the 
governance of the institution—an enforcement action carried out by the Health 
Assembly itself. Hence, the enforcement regime is internal outcasting: 
“internal” because the punishment is carried out by officials internal to the 
regime, and “outcasting” because the punishment constitutes exclusion from 
some of the benefits of community membership. 
C. External Outcasting  
This brings us to the final form of law enforcement—external outcasting. 
To put external outcasting into context, recall that external physical 
enforcement violates the requirement of the Modern State Conception that the 
law be enforced by officials of the regime. Internal outcasting, on the other 
hand, meets the internality requirement but violates the brute force 
 
169.  Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 11, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 
U.N.T.S. 185 (“Each Member shall be represented by not more than three delegates, one of 
whom shall be designated by the Member as chief delegate.”). 
170.  Id. arts. 16-18, 24, 28-29. 
171.  Id. arts. 21, 22. 
172.  Id. art. 7. 
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requirement—it does not require or permit officials to use physical force. 
External outcasting is distinguished from these two forms of law enforcement 
in that it violates both the internality and the brute force requirements—it is 
enforced by officials outside the legal regime without the use of physical force 
at any point in the enforcement chain. Outlawry under medieval Icelandic law, 
for example, was enforced not by the Allthing itself but by individual members 
of society. And the enforcement operated primarily (though not exclusively) by 
denying the outlaw the benefits of social cooperation and membership, rather 
than through physical force. 
To see how external outcasting applies in international law, we return to 
the example of the WTO. As we noted in Part I, the WTO falls far short in the 
estimation of the Modern State Conception: it violates both the internality and 
the brute force requirements. And yet, the WTO is widely regarded as one of 
the strongest and most effective international legal regimes in existence. How 
is that possible? 
We can now see that the WTO uses external outcasting to enforce its rules. 
The trade law principles established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade are not enforced internally—that is, by the officials of the WTO itself. 
Yes, the WTO has a compulsory dispute resolution system. But the decisions 
rendered by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body are enforced through 
authorized retaliation by the aggrieved state party. It is the states, not the legal 
regime of the WTO itself, that impose the sanction. Enforcement is thus 
external to the legal regime. The enforcement regime of the WTO is also devoid 
of any threat or use of physical force. As we noted earlier, “[t]he WTO has no 
jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas.”173 
Nor are member states permitted recourse to violence to enforce the rules. 
Instead, enforcement is limited to specific, approved, retaliatory trade measures 
taken by the aggrieved parties after a process of adjudication. Like the Icelandic 
outlaw, the state party found in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade simply loses a measure of protection under the legal regime.174 And 
just as in medieval Iceland, the threat of losing the protections of the legal 
regime provides a powerful inducement to compliance.175 
 
173.  Hippler Bello, supra note 38, at 417. 
174.  Of course, the loss of protection is not as complete as it is for the full outlaw. Instead, the 
loss of protection, and hence permissible retaliation by the victim, is limited to an amount 
approved by the Dispute Settlement Body. The principle nonetheless remains the same: the 
law is enforced by lifting the legal protections ordinarily enjoyed by the offender and 
allowing external actors to retaliate without fear of sanction. 
175.  It is worth pausing to note that in international law, internal and external outcasting often 
occur hand-in-hand. A state found in violation of an international legal regime will often 
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The WTO is far from alone. Indeed, once we begin to look at international 
law through the prism of external outcasting, we see that it is everywhere. It is 
used to enforce international regulatory regimes such as the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation and the International Telecommunication Union; 
it is used to enforce the rules of regional organizations such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights; it is used by the United Nations Security 
Council to “give effect to its decisions”;176 and it is used to enforce 
environmental legal agreements such as the Montreal Protocol and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. External outcasting 
is so pervasive that it is fair to say that it is the primary mode of law 
enforcement utilized by international legal regimes. In the next Part, we further 
explore external outcasting and examine the various shapes that it takes across 
widely varying areas of international law. 
v. external outcasting in international law 
The concept of external outcasting serves to describe a form of law 
enforcement that is entirely distinct from the Modern State Conception. And in 
the process, it helps us see a set of common features that run through diverse 
international legal institutions—features that the Modern State Conception 
previously rendered invisible. Legal institutions that could not be substantively 
more different—for example, the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species—use the 
same law enforcement model. That model takes on different forms in different 
contexts, but in each case external actors enforce the law through exclusion 
from the benefits of community membership. Seeing this common thread 
opens up a new way of understanding the basic structural foundations of 
international law. 
 
lose its voting rights or other rights to participate in the governance of the regime (internal 
outcasting), while at the same time losing the right to claim the protections or other benefits 
enjoyed by members of the legal regime (external outcasting). See ABRAM CHAYES & 
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 68-87 (1995) (discussing “membership sanctions,” which 
frequently encompass both internal and external outcasting). Alternatively, a legal regime 
might provide for internal outcasting for some types of violations (for example, 
nonpayment of membership fees), and external outcasting for other types of violations (for 
example, violation of the substantive norms of the international legal regime). Our claim is 
not that these are mutually exclusive modes of enforcement but that they can—and should—
be logically distinguished. 
176.  U.N. Charter art. 41. 
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Before we begin, we should note that the dynamic reflected in the concept 
of “outcasting” is partially reflected in the literature on “shaming” and its 
“collateral consequences.”177 Human rights scholarship, in particular, has 
highlighted the ways in which states are sometimes publicly singled out for 
their violations of human rights laws as a nonviolent means of discouraging 
lawbreaking behavior.178 States that are singled out in this way lose the respect 
otherwise accorded to members of the legal regime, and this in turn might have 
concrete collateral consequences. When such shaming is explicitly 
contemplated by the law for the purpose of encouraging states to follow the 
law, then it is an instance of outcasting. 
Consider an example: many human rights agreements require member 
states to make public reports to human rights treaty bodies regarding their 
practices covered by the treaty (usually accompanied by “shadow” reports by 
nongovernmental organizations), followed by a public dialogue with the 
bodies during which a state may be criticized for its practices. This process can 
subject a noncomplying state to shame. To the extent that the shaming is used 
as a nonviolent means of inducing compliance with the human rights treaties—
and, as earlier noted, denies them respect otherwise accorded to members of 
the regime—it is an instance of outcasting (internal outcasting when the 
shaming is done by human rights bodies created by the treaties, external 
outcasting when shaming is done by nongovernmental organizations). As 
important as this is, however, we argue that the earlier literature has missed the 
bigger picture of which shaming is but a very small part.179 
 
177.  One of us has elaborated on the “collateral consequences” that might result from a country’s 
decision to comply or not comply with a treaty regime. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between 
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005). 
178.  See, e.g., RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2012); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN 
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
(1998); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES AND ANTONIA 
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)). Similarly, the so-called “English School” 
has made related arguments about the socialization of states. See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE 
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977); ANDREW HURRELL, 
ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
(2007). For more on norm-based theories of law enforcement, see OONA A. HATHAWAY & 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 111-204 (2005). 
179.  One of the authors’ own work is no exception. See Hathaway, supra note 177; Oona A. 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Oona A. 
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Our argument proceeds in four steps. First, we describe five categories of 
variation in external outcasting regimes. We aim to show that even as we can 
see the common features of international legal institutions that utilize external 
outcasting, we can see—and describe—their differences as well. Second, we 
show not only that we can describe variation in external outcasting regimes, 
but also that we can explain it. The differences between outcasting regimes are 
not random; they are predictable responses to the underlying characteristics of 
the legal systems in which they operate. Third, we show that the characteristics 
of external outcasting regimes are not only responsive to the legal context in 
which they operate, but they also work together. Hence outcasting regimes are 
best understood not as bundles of separate characteristics operating in isolation 
from one another, but as a package of moving parts that work in tandem to 
enable the outcasting regime to address specific challenges. Finally, we end by 
acknowledging that outcasting, for all its strengths, is not a panacea; like other 
law enforcement models, it has its limits that should not be ignored. 
A. Describing Variation in External Outcasting  
We begin by identifying the variations in outcasting regimes and 
examining how they operate across international law. The categories through 
which we examine externalized outcasting here include whether the 
enforcement regime is (1) permissive or mandatory; (2) adjudicated or 
nonadjudicated; (3) in-kind or non-in-kind; (4) proportional or nonproportional; 
and (5) first parties only or third parties as well.180 
The five categories are designed so that every international legal regime 
that uses external outcasting can be classified under each one. Every regime is 
either permissive or mandatory, every regime involves adjudication or not, and 
so on. By giving shape and order to the complex array of international legal 
regimes, we can identify the institutional design choices that underlie each 
regime. This sets the stage, in turn, for a renewed inquiry into the influence of 
international law on state behavior, allowing researchers and practitioners alike 
to better understand and anticipate international law’s shortcomings and 
strengths. 
 
Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003); Oona A. Hathaway, Why 
Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588 (2007).  
180.  The five categories outlined here are not exhaustive, but they do identify what we regard as 
the most salient characteristics of outcasting regimes. 
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1. Permissive or Mandatory?  
An externalized outcasting regime may either permit states to refuse to 
provide an outcast state the benefits of cooperation or it might mandate that 
they deny the benefits of cooperation to the outcast state. Whether an 
outcasting regime is permissive or mandatory thus turns not on what it 
requires of the outcast state, but on the nature of the conduct it requires of the 
outcasting states.181 
The WTO is an example of a permissive regime. As already explained, the 
regime relies on externalized outcasting. Once the Dispute Settlement Body has 
found that a state has acted in violation of the law—and the violating state has 
chosen not to change its behavior—it becomes an outcast. The state that 
originally brought the complaint (external to the WTO) is permitted (but not 
required) to deprive the outcast state of the usual legal protections offered by 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade up to an amount determined by 
the Dispute Settlement Body. 
Economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter offer an 
example of a system of mandatory externalized outcasting sanctions. Chapter 
VII establishes the powers of the United Nation Security Council to maintain 
and restore peace and security.182 The Security Council may use an array of 
techniques to achieve these aims, including “complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations”—in other words, outcasting from existing economic 
relations.183 The United Nations does not actually impose the sanctions itself, 
however. Rather, it directs member states to do so; hence the outcasting is 
externalized. Participation, moreover, is required if the Security Council so 
specifies. The U.N. Charter provides that action “shall be taken by all the 
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council 
may determine.”184 
 
181.  We presume that the decision of whether to outcast a state or not is always permissive. This 
category thus applies not to the decision of whether to render a state an outcast in response 
to its law-violating behavior but of whether to treat the outcast state differently as a result of 
its outcast status. 
182.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
183.  Id. art. 41 (“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”). 
184.  Id. art. 48, para. 1 (emphasis added). In addition, under Article 49 of the Charter, “The 
Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the 
measures decided upon by the Security Council.” Id. art. 49 (emphasis added). 
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To illustrate how the Chapter VII mandatory sanctions regime works in 
practice, consider Security Council sanctions against Libya in the early 
1990s.185 The Security Council issued a resolution that called on the 
Government of Libya to comply with requests relating to the investigation of 
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland and UTA Flight 
772 over Chad and Niger. It called on Libya to “cease all forms of terrorist 
action and all assistance to terrorist groups and . . . demonstrate its 
renunciation of terrorism.”186 And it announced in no uncertain terms that “all 
States shall” adopt aviation, diplomatic, and arms sanctions against Libya “until 
the Security Council decides that the Libyan Government has complied.”187 
After Libya surrendered the suspects for trial in the Netherlands and took 
significant steps to comply with U.N. resolutions, the Security Council lifted 
all sanctions against the country, permitting U.N. member states to resume full 
economic and diplomatic relations.188 States that had imposed sanctions as 
required by the resolutions lifted their sanctions regimes,189 and the country’s 
economy, which had stagnated during the lengthy period of the sanctions 
regime, expanded at a rapid rate: GDP rose thirteen percent in 2003, ten 
percent in 2005, six percent in 2006 and 2007, and four percent in 2008.190  
 
185.  S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992). 
186.  Id. ¶ 2. 
187.  Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). The Security Council later expanded sanctions to require states 
with “financial resources . . . owned or controlled” by Libya to “freeze such funds and 
financial resources.”
 
S.C. Res. 883, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (Nov. 11, 1993). And in 1998, 
the Security Council again reiterated its demands that Libya comply with the earlier 
resolutions, ordered Libya to transfer those accused in the Lockerbie bombing to the 
Netherlands for trial, and threatened “additional measures if the two accused have not 
arrived or appeared for trial promptly.” S.C. Res. 1192, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1192 (Aug. 27, 
1998). 
188.  S.C. Res. 1506, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1506 (Sept. 12, 2003). 
189.  See Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 550 (2011). The U.S. Department of State 
listed Libya as a state sponsoring terrorism from 2000 to 2005, meaning that it remained in 
a restrictive export-licensing category. Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt (last visited Oct. 13, 2011). On June 30, 2006, “the United 
States rescinded Libya’s designation as a state sponsors [sic] of terrorism.” Country Reports 
on Terrorism 2006, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82733.htm 
(last updated May 1, 2007). Nonetheless, lifting of the sanctions regime meant that 
nonstrategic trade, financial transactions, and investment in Libya were permitted. 
190.  GDP Growth (Annual %), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited May 20, 2011). This is not the only such example. 
Between 1946 and 2002, the Security Council used its Chapter VII authority to impose 
sanctions dozens of times, including against Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, and Libya. See PATRIK JOHANSSON, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CHAPTER VII 
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2. Adjudicated or Nonadjudicated?  
Some international legal regimes require adjudication for externalized 
outcasting. As we use the term here, “adjudication” may involve legal process 
in a courtroom, but it need not. An “adjudicated” externalized outcasting 
regime is an outcasting regime in which outcasting is only permitted once a 
body has determined that a norm has been satisfied or violated, where that 
determination is authoritative for the parties. By contrast, an unadjudicated 
outcasting regime permits actors to engage in outcasting without first 
presenting their claims to an authoritative decisionmaking body. 
We have already seen one clear example of an adjudicated external 
outcasting regime: the WTO. A state party that claims to have been harmed by 
another state party’s violations of the underlying trade agreement may lodge a 
complaint with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Once the DSB has 
considered the arguments of both sides, it rules on whether the behavior of the 
accused state party is, in fact, inconsistent with its treaty obligations. If it is, 
and if the wrongdoing state refuses to cure its behavior (and an appellate body 
upholds the DSB’s decision), the state that filed the complaint may then put in 
place the retaliatory trade sanctions that have been approved by the DSB. 
There are also international legal regimes that do not require adjudication 
before state parties engage in externalized outcasting of states that violate their 
legal obligations. Yet they are becoming less common as international legal 
regimes grow increasingly robust. Perhaps the most notable example of 
externalized outcasting without adjudication is the longstanding international 
law doctrine of countermeasures. The International Law Commission (ILC) 
defines countermeasures as “measures, which would otherwise be contrary to 
the international obligations of an injured State vis-à-vis the responsible State” 
if “they were not taken by the former in response to an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessation and reparation.”191 It 
continues, “[c]ountermeasures are a feature of a decentralized system by which 
injured States may seek to vindicate their rights and to restore the legal 
relationship with the responsible State which has been ruptured by the 
internationally wrongful act.”192 Countermeasures thus allow a state party to 
an international agreement to cease performing its obligations toward another 
state party in retaliation for a wrongful act. The countermeasures must be 
 
RESOLUTIONS, 1946-2002—AN INVENTORY (2003). Text of the resolutions from 1946 
through 2009 is available at http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm. 
191.  Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 324 (2001). 
192.  Id. 
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proportional and must terminate as soon as the responsible state has complied 
with its obligations.193 Moreover, the ILC makes clear that such 
countermeasures are only permissible where there is no dispute settlement 
procedure available to the parties.194 
An example of this use of countermeasures—and thus of unadjudicated 
externalized outcasting—can be found in a now-famous 1978 dispute between 
the United States and France.195 The United States and France were parties to a 
bilateral air service agreement. A U.S. airline flew a flight from the United 
States to London, where passengers switched to a smaller plane to fly on to 
Paris. France claimed that this change of planes violated the air service 
agreement. In retaliation, French authorities shortly thereafter ordered a U.S. 
airline to return a flight to London after landing at an airport in Paris, without 
allowing the plane to unload passengers or cargo. Believing that the French 
action violated the agreement, the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board issued an order 
requiring French airlines to file all their flight schedules to and from the United 
States—thus partially suspending a benefit of the treaty. Once the governments 
agreed to submit the case to arbitration, the order was lifted and normal flights 
resumed.196 
3. In-Kind or Non-in-Kind?  
An externalized outcasting regime may enforce the law by engaging in an 
in-kind response—by withdrawing in-kind benefits—or not. Denying in-kind 
benefits simply means denying the outcast the same kind, class, or category of 
benefits that the outcast denied to other members by breaking the rules of the 
regime. Put another way, externalized outcasting that provides for an in-kind 
response allows member states to respond to violations of the rules of the 
 
193.  U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, arts. 51, 53 in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. 
GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/56/20 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles and 
Commentary]. 
194.  The ILC’s articles on state responsibility provide that countermeasures may not be taken or 
must be suspended if the “wrongful act has ceased” and “the dispute is pending before a 
court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties.” Id. art. 
52, para. 3. 
195.  Air Serv. Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417 (Int’l Arb. Trib, 1978).  
196.  HJORTUR B. SVERRISSON, COUNTERMEASURES, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS 92 (2008); David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 820 (2002). For more on the relationship between countermeasures 
and the Air Service Agreement case, see MATH NOORTMANN, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: FROM SELF-HELP TO SELF-CONTAINED REGIMES 35  (2005). 
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regime by engaging in actions vis-à-vis the outcast that would otherwise 
violate the very same rule violated by the outcast in the first place. 
Alternatively, an externalized outcasting regime might enforce the law by 
denying an outcast party a different kind of cooperative benefit than the 
outcast denied to other members by breaking the rules of the regime. We call 
these “cross-countermeasures.”197 
Nearly every regulatory regime employs a version of externalized 
outcasting that denies in-kind benefits of the immediate cooperative regime to 
those that violate it. The international postal service offers a classic example. 
The service is overseen by the Universal Postal Union (UPU), which was 
created by treaty in 1874 and claims to be “the second oldest international 
organization worldwide.”198 The treaty that founded the UPU and successive 
additions and changes together provide for an elaborate system that allows 
mail to be delivered from any member state to any other member state. 
Moreover, the UPU ensures that mail can be delivered to any member state 
using a more or less uniform flat rate, that postal authorities in every member 
state give equal treatment to foreign and domestic mail, and that each country 
retains all money collected for international postage (though subsequent 
revisions provided for the allocation of charges among postal administrations 
according to the difference in the rate of mail delivery between countries).199 
States that fail to meet these obligations may lose their equivalent rights. A 
 
197.  Moreover, cross-countermeasures can be divided into related and unrelated cross-
countermeasures. Related cross-countermeasures are countermeasures that, while non-in-
kind, are directly connected to the benefits the outcast denied to other members. For 
example, as we describe infra text accompanying notes 211-216, the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer provides that states may lose their rights to trade 
in ozone-depleting substances if they fail to comply with their obligations under the 
Protocol to limit their production and consumption of such substances. The regime denies 
the outcast a different kind, class, or category of benefits (loss of trading rights in return for 
environmental pollution) and is thus non-in-kind, but the benefits are related (trading 
rights in ozone-depleting substances in return for excess production or consumption of 
ozone-depleting substances). Unrelated cross-countermeasures, by contrast, are 
countermeasures that are not directly connected in this way. For example, the European 
Convention on Human Rights provides that states may be expelled from the Council of 
Europe for failing to comply with the obligation under the Convention not to torture. See 
infra text accompanying notes 201-204. 
198.  The UPU, UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, http://www.upu.int/en/the-upu/the-upu.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2011); see Treaty Concerning the Formation of a General Postal Union, Oct. 
9, 1874, 19 Stat. 577. The UPU was originally called the “General Postal Union.” 
199.  Treaty Concerning the Formation of a General Postal Union, supra note 198, arts. 2, 3, 9; 
Additional Protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, Nov. 14, 1969, 22 
U.S.T. 1056, 810 U.N.T.S. 7; GEORGE A. CODDING, THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION: 
COORDINATOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MAILS 97 (1964).  
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member state may thus suspend the mail delivery to and from a state that 
refuses to reciprocate.200 Therefore, the UPU uses denial of an in-kind benefit 
as a means of enforcement. 
Externalized outcasting regimes may alternatively deny an outcast non-in-
kind benefits—deploying what we call cross-countermeasures. Cross-
countermeasures are most likely to be found in contexts in which it is illegal, 
impossible, or excessively costly for states to retaliate for lawbreaking behavior 
by withdrawing in-kind benefits. For example, consider the European 
Convention on Human Rights.201 The Convention is the most ambitious—and 
successful—international human rights regime in the world. But it cannot 
work through in-kind outcasting. If a member state fails to meet its obligations 
under the Convention by, say, torturing one of its citizens, the other member 
states may not retaliate by torturing one of their own citizens. To do so would 
be obviously illegal and ineffective. The Convention instead uses externalized 
outcasting from the Council of Europe as the penalty—effectively threatening 
to deny the outcast state the benefits it enjoys from participating in the web of 
economic, political, and legal ties with other member states.202 Moreover, if the 
member does not comply with the Committee’s request, “the Committee may 
 
200.  Universal Postal Convention art. 72, July 5, 1947, 62 Stat. 3157, 4 T.I.A.S. 482 (terminated by 
the Universal Postal Convention, July 11, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 1118, 169 U.N.T.S. 3) (“When a 
country does not observe the provisions of Article 28 concerning freedom of transit, 
Administrations have the right to discontinue postal service with that country. They must 
give advance notice of that measure by telegraph to the Administrations concerned.”). A 
nearly identical provision appeared, as well, in the 1952 Convention, which superseded the 
1948 Convention. Universal Postal Convention art. 33, July 11, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 1118, 163 
U.N.T.S. 3; see CODDING, supra note 199, at 112 (noting that “a similar article has been 
included in postal conventions since 1920”). 
201.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. The Convention may be enforced through submissions to 
the European Court of Human Rights. Id. art. 33 (“Any High Contracting Party may refer to 
the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the protocols thereto 
by another High Contracting Party.”); id. art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications from 
any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder 
in any way the effective exercise of this right.”). 
202.  The Statute of the Council of Europe provides that “[a]ny member of the Council of Europe 
which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of representation 
and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw under Article 7.” Statute of the 
Council of Europe art. 8, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103. Article 3 provides: “Every member 
of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment 
by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council as specified in 
Chapter I.” Id. art. 3. 
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decide that it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such date as the 
Committee may determine.”203 The strength of the Convention thus ultimately 
rests on a threat of ejection from the Council of Europe, and a complete loss of 
the benefits that come with that membership—including a vast array of 
political, economic, and regulatory programs, and access to over two hundred 
treaties open only to Council of Europe members.204 
4. Proportional or Nonproportional?  
Externalized outcasting regimes either require a proportional response to 
lawbreaking behavior or permit a nonproportional one. Outcasting regimes 
that require a proportional response generally require that the harm done to the 
outcast state through the denial of the benefits of community membership be 
equivalent to the harm done by the outcast state through its lawbreaking 
behavior. This requirement is more often found in outcasting regimes that 
provide for the withdrawal of in-kind benefits, for the obvious reason that it is 
simpler to craft a proportional response when the response is similar in kind to 
the original violation. The alternative is a regime that permits a 
nonproportional response—one in which the harm done to the outcast state 
through denial of community benefits need not be calibrated to match the 
harm done by the outcast state through its lawbreaking behavior. 
We return to the international law doctrine on countermeasures for an 
example of proportional externalized outcasting. The International Law 
Commission states that “[c]ountermeasures must be commensurate with the 
injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful 
act and the rights in question.”205 The proportionality requirement for 
countermeasures means that, as Thomas Franck once put it, “an otherwise 
lawful response to an unlawful act, if it crosses the threshold of 
proportionality, may become unlawful.”206 As the arbitral tribunal explained in 
the Air Service Agreement arbitration discussed above, “It is generally agreed 
that all counter-measures must, in the first instance, have some degree of 
equivalence with the alleged breach . . . .”207 That requirement was clearly met 
 
203.  Id. art. 8. 
204.  Complete List of the Council of Europe’s Treaties, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (listing 210 
Council of Europe treaties). 
205.  ILC Draft Articles and Commentary, supra note 193, art. 51. 
206.  Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 715, 716 (2008). 
207.  Air Serv. Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416, para. 83 (1978). 
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in the Air Service Agreement arbitration, the ILC later pointed out, because the 
countermeasures were taken in the “same field as the initial measures and 
concerned the same routes.”208 
A regime that provides for nonproportional externalized outcasting—or at 
least does not expressly require a response proportional to the injury suffered—
is Chapter VII’s economic sanctions. As noted above, Chapter VII allows the 
Security Council to respond to any “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression” and to act to “maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”209 One way in which the Security Council does so is through 
economic sanctions—essentially denying the lawbreaking state the benefits of 
economic cooperation with other U.N. member states. Although this 
enforcement action by member states may be proportional to the harm inflicted 
by the lawbreaking behavior that incited the Chapter VII action, it need not be. 
5. First Parties Only or Third Parties Included?  
International legal regimes that enforce through externalized outcasting 
may involve outcasting by first parties only or they may involve outcasting by 
third parties as well. First-party outcasting regimes allow only those states that 
are directly injured by the unlawful behavior of the outcast state to exclude the 
lawbreaking state from the benefits of community membership. By contrast, 
those regimes that include outcasting by third parties allow states other than 
those directly injured to suspend benefits. 
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding provides for outcasting by 
first parties only. A state must have been actually harmed by the illegal behavior 
of a state in order to participate in its outcasting. Only an injured party may 
invoke the dispute settlement procedure and only parties that have invoked the 
dispute settlement procedure may suspend concessions or other obligations 
vis-à-vis the lawbreaking state. The Dispute Settlement Understanding makes 
this plain: “any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may 
request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member 
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements.”210 Hence only first-party outcasting is permitted. 
By contrast, almost any international legal regime that suspends 
membership rights of an outcast state includes third parties. For an example, let 
us return to the Universal Postal Union. There, a state that fails to meet its 
 
208.  ILC Draft Articles and Commentary, supra note 193, art. 51 commentary. 
209.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
210.  DSU, supra note 33, art. 22. 
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obligations can find its reciprocal rights suspended. During the suspension, 
states that are members of the UPU are no longer obligated to deliver mail to 
or from the outcast state. That is true even for states never directly harmed by 
the outcast state’s unlawful actions, whatever they may have been. Another 
example of third-party outcasting is offered by Chapter VII economic 
sanctions. As already described, U.N. member states are not only permitted to 
participate in Chapter VII economic sanctions against states that have done 
them no direct harm, but they are sometimes even required to do so. 
B. Explaining Variation in External Outcasting 
There are many different forms of external outcasting, and those 
differences are not random. They are instead quite systematic—differences in 
outcasting regimes can be traced to differences in the legal rules to be enforced. 
Thus we can not only describe differences between outcasting regimes; we can 
also explain why the use of different regimes in different circumstances is to be 
expected. 
Let us begin with what we call “simple outcasting.” Simple outcasting is 
outcasting that is permissive, nonadjudicated, in-kind, proportional, and first parties 
only. Simple outcasting is possible when the agreement directly creates private 
benefits—for example, an agreement that grants the airlines of member states 
the right to fly over one another’s territory, an agreement that provides legal 
protections to diplomats, or an agreement that provides for the extradition by 
each state of those suspected of committing crimes in the territory of the other. 
But simple outcasting is not always possible or desirable. For example, 
outcasting may be so costly to the outcasting states that they will not 
voluntarily engage in it. In those cases, simple outcasting will almost certainly 
be ineffective. To work, the external outcasting regime must be modified to 
respond to the particular challenge posed by the legal context in which it 
operates or face irrelevance. Each characteristic—permissive or mandatory, 
adjudicated or nonadjudicated, in-kind or non-in-kind, proportional or 
nonproportional, and first parties only or third parties included—can be 
expected to respond to particular underlying features of the legal regime. 
Seeing this helps us understand much of the variation we find in many of 
the international legal regimes that exist in the world today. It is plausible to 
suppose that these regimes were shaped by the dynamics we identify here, even 
though those making design choices likely would not have described or 
explained them as we do. Understanding how outcasting regime design 
responds to particular underlying characteristics of the law it governs also 
points the way toward making improvements in the enforcement of 
international law. It can help us consider how to address what may initially 
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appear to be insurmountable enforcement problems—problems that, more 
often than not, could be overcome by smart institutional design that is 
cognizant of the many available variations in outcasting regimes. 
1. Outcasting Is Costly? Make It Mandatory 
An external outcasting regime requires member states to withdraw 
cooperative benefits from a state that violates the law. The withdrawal of 
cooperative benefits is meant to create an incentive for the outcast state to 
change its behavior. Yet in some cases, outcasting is costly not simply to the 
outcast state but to those doing the outcasting as well. Outcasting, after all, 
deprives both the outcast state and outcasting state (or states) of the benefits of 
cooperation with one another.  
A possible regime design response to this dilemma is to make outcasting 
mandatory, rather than permissive. In such cases, member states may be 
required to engage in outcasting, rather than being left with a choice as to 
whether to outcast or not. In the case described above of Chapter VII economic 
sanctions against Libya, for example, the Security Council required member 
states to participate. As a result, there was much more widespread participation 
and the sanctions regime was much more successful than would likely have 
been the case were the decision to put in place sanctions left to each individual 
country. 
2. The Regime Creates Public, Not Private, Benefits? Use Cross-
Countermeasures 
Consider an agreement among states to forbear from human rights 
violations against their own citizens. Such an agreement does not itself create 
private benefits for member states but is rather designed to foster the public 
good of human rights. As a result, simple outcasting is infeasible—suspending 
a human rights treaty norm (such as the prohibition on torturing one’s own 
citizens) in response to the violation of that norm would be both illogical and 
ineffective. The same is obviously true of many environmental agreements, as 
well as a variety of other agreements that create public goods. 
One might think that in these contexts external outcasting is impossible. 
But, in fact, it simply requires a different form of external outcasting. In-kind 
sanctions are not possible, so they must be replaced with sanctions that are 
non-in-kind, or what we call cross-countermeasures. It is true, for example, 
that a stand-alone human rights agreement does not permit enforcement 
through simple outcasting. But that problem can be solved by embedding the 
human rights regime in a larger community structure, just as the European 
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Convention on Human Rights is embedded within the Council of Europe. 
Embedding the Convention within a broader community makes it possible to 
employ cross-countermeasures as part of the Convention’s externalized 
outcasting regime. The threatened penalty for extreme noncompliance is 
exclusion from the Council of Europe and all the benefits of membership that 
come with it—the violation of the human rights agreement is thus enforced by 
outcasting that utilizes non-in-kind sanctions: rather than threaten torture in 
response to torture, the regime threatens exclusion from the private benefits 
generated by the broader set of relationships of which the human rights 
agreement is a part. 
Where opportunities for cross-countermeasures do not already exist, they 
can be created through careful institutional design. A treaty regime can create 
private membership benefits that may then be withdrawn from states that 
violate the rules of the legal regime. An example of this can be found in the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer211—an 
agreement designed to protect the ozone layer by restricting and eventually 
eliminating the production of substances that cause ozone depletion, 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) chief among them. The Protocol obligates states 
to report certain data on a regular basis and to limit their production and 
consumption of certain specified ozone-depleting chemicals.212 In return, state 
parties receive some private benefits above and beyond the public benefit of 
halting the depletion of the ozone layer. Specifically, state parties gain access to 
trading privileges that nonparties do not have. While parties must ban the 
import and export of certain designated substances from and to nonparties,213  
they are permitted to import and export those substances from and to 
parties.214 Hence parties are included in the trading regime for the designated 
substances and are able to buy and sell them, whereas nonparties are not. 
These provisions encourage participation in the Protocol, by denying 
nonparties access to (and making it difficult for them to sell) the listed ozone-
depleting substances. But they also have the effect of creating a tangible benefit 
that can be denied to noncomplying states. The trading rights of parties can be 
suspended under the “indicative list of measures” from “specific rights and 
 
211.  Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The Montreal Protocol 
is a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324. 
212.  Montreal Protocol, supra note 211, arts. 2, 3, 5, 7. 
213.  Id. art. 4. 
214.  Id. 
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privileges under the Protocol . . . including those concerned with . . . trade.”215 
A state that fails to comply with its obligations under the Protocol could find 
its rights and privileges suspended.216 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) takes a similar approach 
in a very different substantive context. The IAEA aims to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons while promoting peaceful nuclear programs. 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons requires that non-
nuclear-weapon states sign a contract with the IAEA, called a Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement.217 That agreement requires states not to use nuclear 
material to make weapons or other explosive devices. To ensure that they are 
living up to their commitments, states agree to grant the IAEA access to 
peaceful nuclear facilities and to allow it to employ various verification systems. 
States that sign the contract then gain access to a variety of programs through 
the IAEA for promoting scientific and technical cooperation on peaceful uses of 
nuclear technology. The IAEA offers participating states economic assistance, 
expert services, specialized equipment, training, and other types of support. It 
also supports research and development, and “helps countries assess and plan 
their energy needs.”218 Any state that then fails to permit inspectors access or 
otherwise violates its Safeguards Agreement can be outcast from this regime, 
losing access to the financial and technical support that it provides.219 
3. Outcasting Is Too Attractive? Require Adjudication or Proportional 
Sanctions  
Sometimes the problem with an outcasting regime is that outcasting is too 
attractive. States may be looking for an excuse to legally disregard the 
constraints of the regime by outcasting a suspected wrongdoer. For instance, 
 
215.  UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER 297 (6th ed. 2003). 
216.  See Duncan Brack, Monitoring the Montreal Protocol, in VERIFICATION YEARBOOK 2003, at 209, 
220-21 (Trevor Findlay ed., 2003). State parties that fail to comply with any aspect of the 
treaty are initially engaged in an iterative nonconfrontational exchange meant to bring them 
back into compliance with the Protocol. Id. at 216-24. 
217.  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. 3, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
218.  Promoting Science and Technology, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/ 
OurWork/ST/index.html (last visited June 20, 2011). 
219.  See, e.g., DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: THE 
FIRST 40 YEARS 290 (1997) (“On 10 June 1994, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to 
suspend all IAEA technical assistance to the DPRK.”). 
  
outcasting: enforcement in domestic and international law 
323 
 
economic or trade sanctions may in some cases be highly attractive to states. 
Import-competing interest groups within a state can be expected to welcome 
the opportunity to increase trade barriers. An increase in tariffs or restriction 
on trade with an outcast state will almost always find an appreciative domestic 
audience—though over time the costs of the restriction to the domestic 
economy as a whole will exceed any short-term concentrated benefits. 
In such cases, an outcasting regime may use two techniques to rein in 
outcasting behavior. First, it may require adjudication. Adjudication by an 
authoritative disinterested decisionmaker serves to assure that a violation in 
fact occurred and is not a mere pretext for retaliatory action. It offers an 
opportunity, as well, for parties to resolve differing interpretations of treaty 
obligations. It can also serve to slow down the outcasting response, preventing 
what might otherwise become a rapid cycle of retaliation and 
counterretaliation. And adjudication serves to legitimate the outcasting 
response, hence reducing the chance that the outcast state will regard the 
outcasting action as itself lawbreaking and seek to retaliate.220 Second, the 
regime may require that the outcasting be proportional to the harm done by 
the outcast’s lawbreaking behavior. The proportional response serves the 
purpose of imposing a cost on the outcast for its lawbreaking behavior and 
thus discourages such behavior in the future. If the outcasting is done by the 
harmed party, proportional outcasting may also serve a kind of compensatory 
function. But requiring that the outcasting be proportional helps to ensure that 
the outcasting party will not reap benefits that exceed the harm suffered—and 
thus find outcasting too attractive. Again, this serves to keep the outcasting in 
check—allowing discipline to be imposed on the outcast but keeping the 
response within strict bounds. 
4. First-Party Outcasting Is Ineffective? Bring in Third Parties  
First-party outcasting—outcasting by the party harmed by the outcast’s 
lawbreaking behavior—is not always effective on its own. In a cooperative 
regime to which all member states contribute, outcasting by a single party that 
is harmed by the uncooperative behavior of another state may not provide 
much of an incentive for the outcast state to change its wayward behavior. 
Consider, for example, the Chapter VII economic sanctions against Libya 
discussed above. Libya was suspected of playing a role in the bombing of Pan 
 
220.  Tom Tyler has extensively and persuasively argued that procedural justice contributes 
importantly to the legitimacy of the law and hence to people’s willingness to comply with it. 
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE 93-95 (2011); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
OBEY THE LAW 104-57 (2006). 
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Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and UTA Flight 772 over Chad and 
Niger. If only the United Kingdom, Chad, and Niger had put in place 
economic sanctions against Libya, the economic pressure on Libya would have 
likely been minimal and therefore ineffective. Instead, the Security Council 
mandated sanctions by all U.N. members—thus requiring third parties to 
participate in the outcasting.221 The outcasting was much more effective as a 
result—and Libya eventually surrendered the suspects for trial. 
C. Eight Externalized Outcasting Regimes 
The characteristic-by-characteristic story we have told so far provides only 
a partial picture. We have shown how each characteristic responds to the 
environment in which the outcasting regime operates. But that story obscures 
how the characteristics operate together. Based on the five characteristics 
described above, there are thirty-two unique possible variations in outcasting 
regimes. It is only in examining these variations—and how they are actually 
put to use in international law—that the full richness of the outcasting 
enforcement model becomes clear. 
Almost as interesting as what we find in comparing these thirty-two 
variations to existing legal institutions is what we do not find. Certain 
combinations of characteristics are rare. It is not that they are impossible, but 
they are likely to exist only in unusual circumstances. 
First, when outcasting is in-kind, it is almost always proportional. This is 
understandable because outcasting regimes aim to limit uncooperative 
behavior. Yes, refusing cooperative benefits to an outcast state serves a broader 
goal of promoting cooperative behavior. But if the penalty is excessive, it could 
undermine the regime. Requiring in-kind outcasting behavior to be 
proportional serves to limit this danger. 
Second, non-in-kind, proportional outcasting is unlikely to exist unless it is 
also adjudicated. The reason is perhaps obvious. If the outcasting penalty is 
non-in-kind, determining a proportional response is a challenge. For example, 
what should the economic penalty be for a violation of the laws of war? In most 
cases, the appropriate proportional non-in-kind outcasting penalty for a 
violation can only be legitimately resolved by bringing in an authoritative 
decisionmaking body. 
Third, outcasting by third parties almost always requires adjudication. A 
reason for this was voiced during the debate at the International Law 
 
221.  In this case, the third-party economic sanctions were mandatory, but they can also be 
permissive. 
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Commission over defining the scope and reach of customary law 
countermeasures. As one scholar explained: 
There was a general reluctance to widening the circle of states 
empowered to resort to such powerful means in safeguarding 
fundamental interests of the international legal order. In light of the 
risks entailed in allowing individual third states to apply sanctions in 
response to a breach that does not directly affect them, [a delegate] 
supported institutionalized responses.222  
Involving third parties in outcasting increases the risk that the system of 
cooperation will unravel; adjudication helps control and restrict the outcasting 
and thus contains the risk. 
Fourth, first-party outcasting regimes are unlikely to be mandatory. First-
party outcasting regimes give states that are harmed by the lawbreaking 
behavior of another state the opportunity to respond by withdrawing 
cooperative benefits from that state. If a state was truly harmed by the illegal 
behavior, it is not usually necessary to require the harmed state to respond. 
That is all the more true if the outcasting regime is in-kind—for if it was in the 
outcast’s interests to defect, the outcasting state will likely also find (authorized 
and hence lawful) defection attractive. 
These are not hard and fast rules; in many cases, it is possible to point to 
exceptions. And yet, they serve to limit the number of variations of outcasting 
regimes commonly found. We have identified real-world examples for only 
one of the eight possible in-kind, nonproportional outcasting regimes, for only 
one of the four possible nonadjudicated, non-in-kind, proportional regimes, 
for only one of the eight possible nonadjudicated, third-parties-included 
regimes, and for none of the eight possible mandatory, first-parties-only 
regimes.223 As a result, we have identified existing international legal regimes 
 
222.  ELENA KATSELLI PROUKAKI, THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
COUNTERMEASURES, THE NON-INJURED STATE AND THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 74 (2010). 
223.  The only in-kind, nonproportional regime for which we find real-world examples is 
discussed in Subsection V.C.4 below (“Three Steps Removed: Adjudicated, Nonproportional, 
and Third Parties Included”). The only non-in-kind, proportional, nonadjudicated regime 
for which we find real-world examples is discussed in Subsection V.C.5 below (“Three Steps 
Removed: Mandatory, Non-in-Kind, and Third Parties Included”). The only third-parties-
included, nonadjudicated regime for which we find real-world examples is also discussed in 
Subsection V.C.5 below (“Three Steps Removed: Mandatory, Non-in-Kind, and Third 
Parties Included”). We find not a single real-world example of a mandatory, first-parties-
only regime. Again, however, we emphasize that our survey is not exhaustive and that there 
may be real-world examples of these regimes that we have not yet identified. 
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for only one quarter of the thirty-two possible variations of outcasting regimes. 
We examine these eight variations and consider real-world examples of each. 
Our initial survey is far from exhaustive, however. There certainly are many 
more examples of outcasting than are identified here, some of which likely 
match some of the twenty-four variations excluded below. This discussion thus 
merely provides a starting point for considering the ways in which external 
outcasting is regularly and extensively used to enforce international law. And it 
serves to show how the five characteristics of external outcasting regimes work 
together to address specific challenges posed by particular international legal 
regimes. 
1. Simple Outcasting 
We begin, once again, with what we call simple outcasting. Simple 
outcasting is permissive, nonadjudicated, in-kind, and proportional, and only 
first parties are included. 
Customary countermeasures are a clear example of this form of external 
outcasting. Such countermeasures are permissive—an injured state is never 
required to put in place countermeasures. They are nonadjudicated—a state 
can put them in place without first seeking a decision from an authoritative 
decisionmaking body. They are in-kind—they involve suspension of 
obligations that “correspond to, or are directly connected with, the obligation 
breached.”224 As discussed in more depth above, countermeasures must be 
proportional. And, finally, only the injured state (first party) is permitted to 
put in place countermeasures; hence, third-party action is prohibited. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides an example of 
simple outcasting. Article 60 of the Convention states: “A material breach of a 
bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a 
ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in 
part.”225 It further explains that a “material breach” of a multilateral treaty by 
one of the parties entitles any party specially affected by the breach “to invoke 
it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in 
the relations between itself and the defaulting State.”226 Like customary 
countermeasures, therefore, Article 60 allows for simple outcasting—
permitting parties harmed by a breach to respond by suspending the in-kind, 
 
224.  ILC Draft Articles and Commentary, supra note 193, art. 48 commentary (internal citation 
omitted). 
225.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
226.  Id. 
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proportional obligations of the harmed party toward the party that caused the 
harm without first seeking adjudication.227 
2. One Step Removed: Adjudicated 
A second type of externalized outcasting regime differs from simple 
outcasting in just one respect—it is adjudicated. This type of externalized 
outcasting can therefore only take place once it has been approved by an 
authoritative decisionmaking body. Like simple outcasting, however, it is 
permissive, in-kind, and proportional, and only first parties are included. 
The signal example of this type of externalized outcasting is the World 
Trade Organization. The countermeasures regime under the WTO is virtually 
identical to the customary countermeasures regime, with one key difference: 
before in-kind, proportional, first-parties-only countermeasures are permitted, 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body must make a finding of wrongdoing and 
approve the proposed countermeasures. This serves to discipline and slow the 
outcasting process, allowing outcast states plenty of opportunity to self-correct 
before sanctions are put in place. This, in turn, serves to preserve the trade 
system and head off the escalation of a dispute over the treaty obligations into a 
trade war. 
3. Two Steps Removed: Adjudicated and Non-in-Kind  
A third type of externalized outcasting regime differs from simple 
outcasting in two respects—it is adjudicated and non-in-kind. Like simple 
outcasting, it is permissive and proportional, and only first parties are 
included. 
All of the international legal regimes that fall into this category involve a 
state party giving up its sovereign immunity and allowing itself to be sued—
usually in a specialized forum—if the other party believes that it has violated 
the terms of an international agreement. If the state is found to have violated 
the law and to have harmed the complaining party as a result, the state is 
usually subject to a binding obligation to pay damages or make other 
reparations. 
 
227.  Article 60 operates very much like customary countermeasures, but with one key difference: 
countermeasures temporarily suspend only the obligations of the wronged state, whereas 
Article 60 allows the wronged party to either formally suspend or permanently terminate 
the treaty obligations of both parties in whole or in part. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 
supra note 191, at 324. 
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There are numerous examples of these regimes. Consider Chapter Eleven 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Under NAFTA, Mexico, the 
United States, and Canada must grant one another’s investors 
nondiscriminatory treatment and may not expropriate their investments except 
in extraordinary circumstances. If a member state (or those for whom member 
states are responsible under international law, such as provincial, state, or 
municipal governments) violates these requirements, Chapter Eleven permits 
an investor to seek money damages against the state that allegedly violated the 
law.228 The case proceeds to arbitration, as detailed in the agreement.229 The 
decision of the arbitral tribunal is final and binding on the parties to the case.230 
This provision is not a mere dead letter; it has been actively used, leading to 
awards against member states. For instance, an American corporation, 
Metalclad, won an arbitral award of $16.6 million against Mexico after a 
Mexican municipal government refused to provide a construction permit for a 
hazardous landfill even though the construction had already been approved by 
the Mexican federal government.231 
Why does outcasting take the form it does in this case? To begin with, in-
kind retaliation is not a viable option for a long-term sustainable regime. If a 
member state fails to provide adequate protection to the investments of the 
national of another member state, the harmed member state cannot simply be 
permitted to retaliate by similarly disregarding the protection of investments of 
the bad actor’s nationals. Such a system of direct retaliation would likely lead 
to immediate collapse of the agreement because investment requires a high 
degree of stability and security that would be undermined by the reciprocal 
retaliation. Hence it is necessary to turn to non-in-kind retaliation, or cross-
countermeasures. Here, the cross-countermeasure is the loss of sovereign 
immunity that would otherwise be guaranteed under customary international 
law and hence loss of insulation from a decision that obligates the state to pay 
damages or make other reparations for the harm done as a result of a legal 
violation. Each member state agrees to allow parties that allege they have been 
harmed by unlawful behavior to file an arbitral claim against the offenders 
 
228.  See North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057 [hereinafter 
NAFTA], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/NAFTA/chap-111.asp. 
229.  Id. arts. 1120-37. 
230.  Id. art. 1136. 
231.  Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award ¶ 131 
(Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/ 
Mexico/Metalclad/MetalcladFinalAward.pdf. 
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seeking compensation.232 As with most instances of non-in-kind outcasting, an 
adjudicatory body is necessary to determine the appropriate remedy. The 
parties agree to treat that body’s decision as final and binding.233 
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA is far from alone. Chapter Eleven was based in 
significant part on the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).234 Like 
Chapter Eleven, the U.S. Model BIT requires a host state to submit investment 
disputes to binding third-party arbitration at the request of an investor.235 The 
externalized outcasting thus operates in the same way as Chapter Eleven. But 
this model is not limited to investment disputes. It applies, as well, to the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal, the Law of the Sea Convention (which provides various 
binding dispute resolution options), the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims 
Tribunal, the U.N. Compensation Commission, and every other international 
agreement that grants jurisdiction to a dispute resolution body with power to 
render a binding judgment against a state party. 
Indeed, most notable of all is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Like 
NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven, the ICJ statute provides that states that accept the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction agree to give up a limited degree of sovereign immunity—
permitting a case to be brought against them to resolve a dispute concerning 
the interpretation of a treaty, a question of international law, and the existence 
of a breach of an international obligation.236 If the state is found in breach of an 
international legal obligation, the ICJ has the authority to determine the 
“nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
 
232.  Indeed, Chapter Eleven has come under fire from public interest groups for precisely this 
reason. See MARY BOTTARI & LORI WALLACH, PUB. CITIZENS GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, 
NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES: LESSONS FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICA FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT, at viii (2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
NAFTAReport_Final.pdf (“[T]he sovereign immunity shield—the long-standing common 
law principle that governments cannot be sued for certain types of activities—does not apply 
in NAFTA’s private tribunal system. This means that foreign investors are empowered to 
sue the United States for cash compensation over federal, state and local policies in instances 
when U.S. residents and companies would have no such right.”). 
233.  That commitment, in turn, is given force by the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force June 7, 1959). 
234.  U.S. Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment, Feb. 24, 1984, reprinted in 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 136 (1986). 
235.  Id. art. 24. 
236.  Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. 
No. 993. 
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obligation.”237 Thus the ICJ permits the harmed state to engage in proportional 
and adjudicated cross-countermeasures against the offending state. 
4. Three Steps Removed: Adjudicated, Nonproportional, and Third Parties 
Included  
A fourth type of externalized outcasting regime differs from simple 
outcasting in three key respects—it is adjudicated and nonproportional, and 
third parties are included. The only similarities it bears to simple outcasting, 
then, are that it is permissive and involves in-kind sanctions. 
A significant number of regulatory in-kind membership sanctions fall into 
this category. The International Coffee Organization provides a typical 
example. The Organization provides assistance to coffee growers around the 
world and encourages coffee-growing nations to engage in enhanced 
cooperation on trade, sustainability, quality, and consumption promotion.238 
The Agreement that governs the Organization states that if a member is in 
breach of its obligations, the governing body, the International Coffee Council, 
may “exclude such Member from the Organization.”239 Once excluded, the 
member loses all rights and privileges under the agreement. This includes not 
only voting rights in the organization and other benefits provided directly by 
the organization (the exclusion from which constitutes internal outcasting), but 
also rights granted to it by other member states by virtue of its status as a 
member—including access to trade privileges and other forms of “cooperation 
on coffee matters.”240 
It is notable that membership sanctions of this form leverage the power of 
third-party actors to bring pressure on member states to comply with the law. 
A threat by a single member to outcast a lawbreaking state by withdrawing in-
kind membership benefits would be unlikely to have a significant impact on 
the outcast’s behavior. But the threat of complete exclusion from the in-kind 
 
237.  Id. art. 36(2)(d). 
238.  Mission, INT’L COFFEE ORG., http://dev.ico.org/mission.asp?section=About_Us (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2010). 
239.  International Coffee Agreement art. 46, Sept. 28, 2007, available at http://www.ico.org/ 
documents/ica2007e.pdf (“If the Council decides that any Member is in breach of its 
obligations under this Agreement and decides further that such breach significantly impairs 
the operation of this Agreement, it may exclude such Member from the Organization. The 
Council shall immediately notify the Depositary of any such decision. Ninety days after the 
date of the Council’s decision, such Member shall cease to be a Member of the Organization 
and a Party to this Agreement.”). 
240.  Id. art. 1(1). 
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benefits of membership by all member states provides a much more emphatic 
incentive to comply with the law. Moreover, third-party sanctions of this form 
are generally accompanied by some form of adjudication. Because the sanction 
is severe—complete exclusion from group benefits—adjudication provides 
security to members that the decision will not be made lightly. That is true in 
the case of the International Coffee Agreement, as it is in most instances of in-
kind membership sanctions: the members of the International Coffee 
Organization may not unilaterally choose to outcast a fellow member. That 
decision must instead be made by the International Coffee Council, the 
authoritative decisionmaking body of the Organization. 
5. Three Steps Removed: Mandatory, Non-in-Kind, and Third Parties 
Included 
A fifth form of external outcasting also differs from simple outcasting in 
three respects: it is mandatory and non-in-kind, and third parties are included. 
It has only two characteristics in common with simple outcasting—it is 
nonadjudicated and proportional. 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) puts in place this kind of outcasting regime. The 
treaty aims to regulate trade in endangered species. It is enforced by exclusion 
of cross-border trade that does not comply with the treaty’s requirements. 
Specifically, the treaty creates a trade system that works as follows: a specimen 
of a CITES-listed species may be imported into or exported (or re-exported) 
from a state party if it is properly documented and if that documentation is 
presented at the port of entry or exit.241 That same species may not be imported 
or exported by a state party without the documentation. A non-state party may 
participate in the trading scheme, but only if it presents documentation 
equivalent to that required of state parties—in other words, only if it follows 
the requirements of the treaty.242 Hence any endangered species listed under 
CITES that does not comply with CITES’ certification requirement is 
 
241.  The Management Authority of the State (which the treaty requires each state party to 
designate) must issue an export permit or re-export certificate. The Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature 
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, arts. III-VI, IX [hereinafter CITES]. The 
Convention separates covered species into three categories, each with different trade 
restrictions. Id. For a sample permit form, see http://www.cites.org/eng/res/12/E12 
-03R14A2.pdf. 
242.  CITES, supra note 241, art. X. 
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prohibited from leaving or entering any state party.243 Only if the trade 
complies with the requirements of CITES may it cross the border of a state 
party.244 
There are several interesting elements of the CITES regime worth noting. 
First, it shows once again how cross-countermeasures can be used where in-
kind sanctions are unavailable. It would be illogical for a member state to kill or 
capture an endangered plant or animal in retaliation for another state killing or 
capturing an endangered plant or animal. Instead, CITES requires each state 
party to use outcasting against any other state party that attempts to trade an 
unlicensed endangered plant or animal by putting in place a cross-
countermeasure—excluding the endangered plant or animal from cross-border 
trade. Second, it shows how third-party outcasting can be used to enhance the 
effectiveness of a regime. CITES requires that only one party to the transaction 
be party to the treaty in order for the trade to be governed by the treaty’s 
requirements, thus allowing the regime to be effective even if many states opt 
out. In this way, including third parties can lead to a highly effective 
enforcement regime, even if outcasting is not uniformly exercised. 
Finally, this type of outcasting regime is unusual in two respects. First, it is 
unusual because it provides for non-in-kind sanctions without requiring prior 
adjudication. Non-in-kind, proportional sanctions are ordinarily accompanied 
by adjudication, because the incommensurability of the harm and the penalty 
makes setting an appropriate outcasting penalty difficult.245 In the cases 
 
243.  How CITES Works, CONVENTION ON INT’L TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA 
AND FLORA, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/how.shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2011). 
244.  Although not specified in the treaty itself, the Conference of the Parties and the Standing 
Committee have adopted a process of recommending suspension of trade in response to 
significant trade in an endangered species by a state party in violation of the Convention. 
When a state party violates the terms of the treaty, the Conference of the Parties can 
recommend a temporary suspension of trade with the violating state. In an effort to improve 
the effectiveness of the Convention, this has become an increasingly frequent practice. (For 
a list of all countries currently subject to such trade suspensions, see Countries Currently 
Subject to a Recommendation To Suspend Trade, CONVENTION ON INT’L TRADE IN 
ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA, http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/ref/ 
suspend.php (last updated Sept. 14, 2011).) The State that has violated a provision of the 
treaty may respond to the recommendation to suspend trade by enacting required 
legislation, reducing illegal trade, submitting missing annual reports, or otherwise 
responding to specific recommendations of the Standing Committee. If it takes the actions 
necessary to bring its practices into compliance, the recommendation to suspend trade is 
immediately withdrawn. Id. (“Recommendations to suspend trade are withdrawn 
immediately upon a country’s return to compliance.”). This constitutes a permissive 
adjudicated outcasting regime—one that matches the variation described in Subsection 
V.C.7 below. 
245.  See supra text accompanying note 222. 
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identified here, however, the outcasting regime overcomes the 
incommensurability problem by requiring states to simply refuse passage to 
the noncomplying plant or animal. Hence, under CITES, the penalty for 
attempting to import or export a plant or animal in violation of the treaty is 
refusal of permission to import or export that plant or animal. In both cases, 
there is little risk of escalation or need for an authoritative decisionmaking 
body to set an appropriate penalty. Second, this type of outcasting is unusual 
in that it involves outcasting by third parties without requiring adjudication. 
Outcasting by third parties almost always requires prior adjudication because 
allowing states to unilaterally apply sanctions in response to a breach that does 
not directly harm them can cause a system of cooperation to quickly unravel. In 
CITES, however, that danger is contained by the presence of widely publicized, 
clear, objective technical standards. As a result, it is highly unlikely that third-
party outcasting will spiral out of control on the basis of unfounded 
accusations or overreactions by third-party outcasting states. 
6. Four Steps Removed: Mandatory, Adjudicated, Non-in-Kind, and Third 
Parties Included  
A sixth category of externalized outcasting differs from simple outcasting in 
four respects: it is mandatory, adjudicated, non-in-kind, and third parties are 
included. It shares only the requirement of proportionality with simple 
outcasting. 
All of international criminal law falls into this category. We tend to think of 
international criminal law as a system for sanctioning individuals—for it is 
individuals who are tried and, if found guilty, jailed. Yet international criminal 
law operates at the same time as a sanction on states. Consider, for example, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has jurisdiction with respect 
to four crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and the crime of aggression.246 These crimes are not creations of the Rome 
Statute, of course. They are already regarded as violations of international law 
that each state is obligated to prevent. A state party that fails to prevent these 
crimes from occurring—and then fails to investigate and prosecute the crime—
agrees to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to these crimes on its 
territory or by its nationals.247 The Rome Statute thus operates as an outcasting 
 
246.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
247.  Id. arts. 12, 17. The substantive and procedural mechanics of complementarity under the ICC 
are covered by Articles 17-19 of the Rome Statute. Substantively, Article 17 requires the 
Court to find a case “inadmissible” if the case “is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
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regime because state parties that violate international law by failing to meet 
their obligation to prevent a serious crime from being committed in their 
territory or by their nationals and then failing to investigate or prosecute that 
crime forfeit their sovereign right to prosecute criminal violations by their own 
citizens or within their own territory. 
Outcasting by the ICC is both mandatory and adjudicated. State parties are 
obligated to prevent and prosecute serious crimes. When they fail to act, and a 
case is referred to the ICC by a state party or by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Prosecutor “shall analyse the 
seriousness of the information received” and “shall submit to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any 
supporting material collected,” if “there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation.”248 The case may only proceed if the Pre-Trial Chamber agrees 
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed.249 It is non-in-kind: failure to 
prevent genocide may not be punished with failure to prevent genocide; it is 
instead punished with the loss of the sole right to engage in criminal 
prosecution. This form of outcasting is proportional—the state only loses sole 
jurisdiction over those crimes that it fails to prevent and prosecute. It retains its 
sovereign control over all other criminal prosecutions in its territory. Finally, 
the outcasting involves third parties, for all states that are party to the 
Convention are obligated to assist in the investigation and prosecution. 
 
 
which has jurisdiction over it,” id. art. 17, para. 1(a), or “has been investigated by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute,” id. art. 17, para. 
1(b). The ICC can only abrogate the right of a state to prosecute if the state is “unwilling or 
unable” to carry out an investigation and prosecution. Id. art. 17, para. 1(a). Procedurally, 
the Prosecutor must notify parties upon initiating investigations and must give states one 
month to respond as to whether investigations are already being undertaken by the state. Id. 
art. 18, para. 1-2 (stating that the Prosecutor must notify “all States Parties and those States 
which . . . would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned”). If a country 
notifies the Prosecutor that it is conducting its own investigation, the Prosecutor cannot 
proceed unless a Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes the investigation. Id. art. 18, para. 2. 
Moreover, the issue of complementarity need not be raised by one of the parties; the ICC 
can “on its own motion” determine whether a case should be left for prosecution to national 
courts. Id. art. 19, para. 1. For more on complementarity, see Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The 
Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery To Implement International Criminal Law, 23 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 869 (2002); Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 86-87 
(2003); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 240, 247 (2000). 
248.  Rome Statute, supra note 246, arts. 13-15. 
249.  Id. art. 15, para. 4. 
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7. Four Steps Removed: Adjudicated, Non-in-Kind, Nonproportional, 
and Third Parties Included 
A seventh category of externalized outcasting also differs from simple 
outcasting in four respects: it is adjudicated, non-in-kind, nonproportional, 
and third parties are included. It shares only one characteristic with simple 
outcasting—it is permissive. 
Permissive economic sanctions regimes fall into this category. Such 
sanctions regimes are again a response to the inability to resort to in-kind 
sanctions. Chapter VII economic sanctions, for example, are authorized in 
response to “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression.”250 Under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, states may not make 
a “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state.”251 Hence a threat to the peace may not be met with 
unilateral military force. Instead, the Security Council may authorize a military 
response (which, as noted earlier, constitutes external physical force) or 
economic sanctions. Those economic sanctions are external outcasting that is 
non-in-kind, adjudicated (by the Security Council), nonproportional, and 
involves third parties. 
Economic sanctions against South Africa offer a striking example. After 
decolonization, South Africa continued to operate under the colonial-era 
system of “apartheid,” an extensive system of legal racial segregation and 
discrimination. Beginning in 1960, in the wake of the Sharpeville massacre, the 
United Nations called on South Africa to end apartheid, to no effect.252 Unable 
to resort to in-kind outcasting, the United Nations turned instead to non-in-
kind outcasting: it put in place cross-countermeasures in the form of economic 
and trade sanctions. In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly 
condemned the policy of apartheid and “the continued and total disregard by 
the Government of South Africa of its obligations under the Charter of the 
United Nations and, furthermore, its determined aggravation of racial issues 
by enforcing measures of increasing ruthlessness involving violence and 
 
250.  U.N. Charter art. 39. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter states, “In the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.” Id. art. 103. Hence if a Security Council resolution calling for 
economic sanctions conflicts with obligations a state may have under a trade agreement, the 
resolution prevails. 
251.  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
252.  S.C. Res. 134, U.N. Doc. S/RES/134 (Apr. 1, 1960). 
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bloodshed.”253 It called on its members to voluntarily sever political, fiscal, and 
transportation ties with South Africa.254 On August 7, 1963, the United Nations 
Security Council noted that “the situation in South Africa is seriously 
disturbing international peace and security,” called on South Africa to abandon 
its policy of apartheid as called for in an earlier Security Council resolution, and 
called on all U.N. member states to put in place a voluntary arms embargo 
against South Africa.255 Several countries, including the United States and the 
United Kingdom, halted their arms trade with South Africa in light of the 
resolution. That arms embargo was later made mandatory in 1977, with the 
passage of Security Council Resolution 418.256 In the intervening fourteen 
years, however, the arms embargo remained permissive. 
8. Five Steps Removed: Mandatory, Adjudicated, Non-in-Kind, 
Nonproportional, and Third Parties Included  
The eighth category of externalized outcasting regime is the polar opposite 
of simple outcasting: it is mandatory, adjudicated, non-in-kind, nonproportional, 
and third parties are included. 
Mandatory economic sanctions fall into this category. Such sanctions are 
put in place through the same process as permissive economic sanctions. Under 
United Nations Charter Chapter VII, the Security Council has the power to act 
in response to “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression.”257 One option available to the Security Council is mandatory 
economic sanctions. We earlier discussed an example of Chapter VII 
mandatory economic sanctions—the sanctions on Libya in the wake of the 
Lockerbie bombing.258 In that case, the U.N. provided that “all States shall” 
adopt aviation, diplomatic, and arms sanctions against Libya “until the 
Security Council decides that the Libyan Government has complied.”259 This 
 
253.  G.A. Res. 1761, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1761 (Nov. 6, 1962). 
254.  Id. ¶ 4. 
255.  S.C. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/181 (Aug. 7, 1963). 
256.  S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977). The arms embargo was strengthened 
and expanded by S.C. Res. 591, U.N. Doc. S/RES/591 (Nov. 28, 1986). The restrictions 
were lifted by Resolution 919 in 1994. U.N. Doc. S/RES/919 (May 25, 1994). 
257.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
258.  See supra text accompanying notes 185-190. 
259.  S.C. Res. 748, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (emphasis added). The Security 
Council later expanded sanctions to require states with “financial resources . . . owned or 
controlled” by Libya to “freeze such funds and financial resources.”
 
S.C. Res. 883, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/883 (Nov. 11, 1993). And in 1998, the Security Council again reiterated its demands 
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was in direct contrast with the South African sanctions regime—which, as 
already noted, was voluntary until 1977, when only the arms embargo was 
made mandatory.260 
Once enacted, mandatory economic sanctions regimes are, on the whole, 
more effective than permissive ones. Economic sanctions can be costly to 
outcasting states as well as the outcast state. Therefore mandating participation 
can lead to much more effective outcasting. Yet mandatory regimes require 
greater political consensus to put them into effect. In the case of sanctions 
against South Africa, several states—including the United Kingdom and 
France—objected to punitive sanctions in 1963,261 but did not reject the 
voluntary regime, choosing instead simply to abstain.262 There was no similar 
opposition to the sanctions against Libya, thus making mandatory sanctions 
possible. 
The European Convention of Human Rights also establishes a mandatory, 
adjudicated, non-in-kind, and nonproportional outcasting regime that includes 
third parties. As described above, the European Convention of Human Rights 
provides for cross-countermeasures because in-kind outcasting is not possible. 
The regime is, moreover, adjudicated: if a state party violates the Convention, 
any person harmed may bring suit before the European Court of Human 
Rights.263 The Court is empowered to require measures to redress the specific 
 
that Libya comply with the earlier resolutions, ordered Libya to transfer those accused in the 
Lockerbie bombing to the Netherlands for trial, and threatened “additional measures if the 
two accused have not arrived or appeared for trial promptly.” S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1192 (Aug. 27, 1998). 
260.  See Raymond Paretzky, Comment, The United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: An 
Analysis of the Laws, Regulations, and Loopholes, 12 YALE J. INT’L L. 133, 134 (1987) (“On 
November 4, 1977, the United States joined in the unanimous vote of the United Nations 
Security Council adopting Security Council Resolution 418, which established a mandatory 
arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa. This resolution succeeded Security 
Council Resolution 181, a non-binding call to all nations to adhere voluntarily to an arms 
embargo, which had been in effect from 1963 to 1977.” (footnotes omitted)). 
261.  See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United 
Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1464, 1486 n.85 (1996) (citing 1963 
U.N.Y.B. 18, U.N. Sales No. 64.I.1). 
262.  See id. at 1485 n.81 (citing Resolutions Adopted and Decisions Taken by the Security 
Council in 1963, U.N. SCOR, 18th Sess., 1041st mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/5386 (1963)). 
Mandatory sanctions, however, later proved more politically palatable than outcasting 
South Africa from the United Nations altogether—a proposal made and rejected in 1974, a 
few years before the arms embargo was made mandatory. See David Lawther Johnson, 
Comment, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 887, 916 (1978). 
263.  The Court is, at present, the most active international court in existence, with more than 
30,000-50,000 new applications lodged every year. The Court has arguably been a victim of 
its own success. Its ability to process complaints cannot keep up with the rate at which they 
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individual harms alleged in the case and make recommendations for more 
general measures to prevent similar violations in the future.264 Once a decision 
is rendered—and individual or general measures are ordered by the Court—
state parties are required to comply.265 If a state party refuses to cooperate with 
a decision of the Court, it could—in an extreme case—find its membership in 
the entire Council of Europe suspended or revoked by the Committee of 
Ministers.266 This penalty involves all the members of the Council (hence it is 
third-parties-included outcasting), need not be proportional to the harm done 
by the outcast state, and is mandatory—once a state is cast out of the Council, 
Council members cannot treat it as if it were still a state party. 
Yet another example of this type of outcasting is the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. As discussed earlier,267 the Protocol 
places limits on the amount of ozone-depleting substances each member state 
may produce and consume. In return for agreeing to observe these limits, state 
parties receive access to trading privileges denied to nonparties: parties to the 
Protocol are only permitted to import and export certain designated substances 
with a country that is also party to the Protocol.268 These trading privileges not 
only make membership in the Protocol attractive to states, but they also 
provide the basis for an outcasting regime. Any state party that violates the 
Protocol can have its trading rights suspended—thus losing access to the 
 
arrive. In 2009, the Court had a backlog of over 120,000 cases. Profile: European Court of 
Human Rights, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country 
_profiles/4789300.stm. A case begins when an individual or state files a complaint or 
“application” alleging a violation of the Convention. Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 33-35, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
264.  The first type of remedy provided by the Court—“individual measures”—aims to address 
the harm to the individual complainant as a result of the violation and to achieve, as far as 
possible, “restitutio in integrum.” COUNCIL OF EUR., SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF 
JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 3RD ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 18 
(2010), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/ 
CM_annreport2009_en.pdf. States may also be ordered to take “general measures,” which 
aim to put an end to similar violations in the future. Id. 
265.  Article 46 of the Convention clarifies that state parties to the Convention must comply with 
decisions of the Court. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 263, art. 46 (“The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the 
final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”). The Court 
automatically transmits the file to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe after 
rendering a final judgment and the Committee is charged with executing the judgment. Id. 
266.  ELISABETH LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 38-39 (2002), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
5BDDF858-F85B-4523-BD58-27243CB2F03C/0/DG2ENHRFILES192002.pdf. 
267.  See supra text accompanying notes 211-216. 
268.  Montreal Protocol, supra note 211, art. 4. 
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benefits created by the regime.269 This outcasting sanction is mandatory (no 
state party is permitted to trade with a state whose trading rights have been 
suspended), adjudicated (the decision to suspend trading rights is made in 
advance by the treaty organization, not by individual parties), non-in-kind (the 
outcasting state does not respond to the violation by consuming and producing 
excess ozone-depleting substances but instead by putting in place trade 
sanctions), and nonproportional (there is no requirement that the trade 
sanctions be equivalent to the harm done by the outcast), and it includes third 
parties (all parties to the convention are prohibited from trading with the 
outcast). 
What is particularly notable about this final category of external outcasting 
is the way in which outcasting regimes are creatively designed to address what 
might at first appear to be insurmountable challenges to outcasting. 
International law scholars habitually point out that human rights law and 
international environmental law cannot be enforced by reciprocal sanctions. 
That is clearly true. But that does not mean that an outcasting mechanism—
denying a lawbreaker the benefits of cooperation—cannot be deployed to 
enforce the law. Doing so simply requires careful and creative institutional 
design. It requires, first, recourse to cross-countermeasures. That, in turn, 
sometimes requires engineering benefits through treaty design—embedding a 
human rights treaty in a robust economic and political regime or creating 
trading benefits only available to state parties. That recourse is strengthened by 
involving third parties and making their participation mandatory—every state 
party is responsible for disciplining the wayward state by outcasting it. And, 
finally, because the penalty is strong and because third parties are involved, the 
outcasting is subject to adjudication—there is a decision rendered by a body 
charged with interpreting the treaty’s requirements. This focuses attention on 
the relevant legal standards, thickening the understanding of the legal rules 
that apply to state behavior while granting the outcasting decision legitimacy 
and preventing a rapid unraveling of the cooperative regime that the outcasting 
is meant to enforce, not weaken. It is outcasting, but it is far from simple. 
D. The Limits of Externalized Outcasting 
For all its strengths, outcasting is not a panacea. Like any law enforcement 
regime, it has its limits. Most notably, externalized outcasting relies on the 
 
269.  Indicative List of Measures That Might Be Taken by a Meeting of the Parties in Respect of Non-
Compliance with the Protocol, § C, in U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER 297 (6th ed. 2003). 
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existence of private benefits for member states. After all, outcasting only works 
if outcast states are denied access to the benefits of cooperation. It is sometimes 
possible to use clever institutional design to overcome this limitation—for 
example, in areas of international law primarily concerned with public goods, 
such as human rights and environmental law, it is possible to deny a state 
access to private benefits through cross-countermeasures. But there are, 
nonetheless, some limits to external outcasting that cannot be so easily 
avoided.270 
1. External Outcasting Relies on Cooperative Benefits 
Outcasting is made possible by the existence of cooperative benefits. For 
outcasting to work, therefore, there must be some degree of cooperation. 
Where there is none or very little, outcasting is powerless. Consider, for 
example, the state of Burma (renamed the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
by the military junta that currently governs). The state is the subject of 
extensive economic sanctions by many countries and has become so isolated 
from the international community that there are few cooperative benefits left to 
withdraw. The international community therefore has relatively little capacity 
to enforce international legal rules against Burma using outcasting sanctions, 
for it is impossible to further outcast a voluntary outcast. 
The dependence of outcasting on the existence of cooperative benefits also 
means that, generally speaking, outcasting is more powerful if there are more 
participants in the outcasting regime. A larger number of participants means 
that the collective benefits are likely to be more significant and therefore the 
outcasting sanction more powerful.271 Put differently, the cost of exclusion 
 
270.  In addition to the limits noted below, outcasting regimes are limited by their reliance on 
detection of violations. Where violations of the law are difficult to detect, an outcasting 
regime will likely be ineffective in generating compliance. For example, regulations of oil 
pollution at sea—covered by a separate section of MARPOL from the equipment 
certification scheme described above—have long been hampered by the difficulty of 
connecting pollution to the source. See Ronald Mitchell, Moira L. McConnell, Alexei 
Roginko & Ann Barrett, International Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL 
MECHANISMS 43 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999). In this respect, however, outcasting is far from 
alone. Any enforcement regime relies on detection of violations. Where violations go 
undetected, enforcement will necessarily be lax and ineffective. 
271.  David Singh Grewal makes a related observation in DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK 
POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2008). He observes that the more 
widespread a norm or practice that facilitates cooperation is, the greater the network power 
that norm or practice may hold—a dynamic he notes can generate resentment as well as 
cooperative behavior. Id.  
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grows as the group from which one is excluded expands. Hence, outcasting 
regimes may require a threshold number of participants to become effective—
particularly outcasting regimes that rely on enforcement by third parties. 
Finally, the reliance of outcasting regimes on ongoing cooperation points to 
a central tension. Much of outcasting is a contradiction in form: it involves the 
use of what would otherwise be lawbreaking in the service of rule-enforcement. 
By denying cooperative benefits to a state that has broken the rules of the legal 
regime, outcasting aims to bring about renewed cooperation. Yet the act of 
outcasting itself is in contradiction with the very cooperation it aims to 
produce. Outcasting regimes can therefore be fragile—too much outcasting can 
bring down the entire system. This tension—and the need to manage it—may 
help explain why the vast majority of modern outcasting regimes in 
international law utilize some form of adjudication. The requirement to go to 
adjudication before outcasting serves as a backstop against unraveling. Even 
when outcasting is permitted, adjudication serves to slow down the system of 
outcasting, allowing cooler heads to prevail. It also frequently serves to temper 
the level of the outcasting sanction—keeping it to levels that provide 
motivation for renewed cooperation without excessively undermining the 
cooperative regime in the process. 
2. Outcasting Favors the Powerful over the Weak 
It is no secret that powerful states are often offered special treatment under 
international law. Viewing international law through the lens of outcasting 
helps explain why: the more a state contributes to the collective benefits shared 
by all the members of a particular legal regime, the harder it is for the other 
member states to discipline that member through outcasting. When a state that 
contributes a great deal to the regime is outcast, all the members of the regime 
lose the benefits of cooperation with the outcast. The aggrieved members may 
find it more expedient, instead, to turn a blind eye to the wrongdoing. In such 
cases, the outcasting penalty will prove weak. 
Regimes that rely on first-party outcasting are especially favorable to larger 
and more powerful states. Recently, for example, Antigua won a case against 
the United States in the World Trade Organization for illegal trade restrictions 
on Internet gambling sites operated from Antigua. In compliance proceedings, 
the arbitrator authorized an “annual level of nullification or impairments of 
benefits accruing to Antigua” equal to $21 million per year, and permitted 
Antigua to “suspend obligations under the TRIPS Agreement at a level not 
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exceeding US $21 million annually.”272 Antigua has so far chosen not to put in 
place the permitted external outcasting sanctions by suspending its obligations 
to the United States. Why? In part because the authorized sanctions were only 
a small fraction of what Antigua had sought. Probably equally important, 
however, is the reality that Antigua has far more to lose from cutting itself off 
from the United States than it has to gain. The United States accounted for 23.5 
percent of Antigua’s exports and a whopping 58.2 percent of Antigua’s imports 
in 2007.273 Antigua has virtually no military, depending instead on the United 
States to provide regional security.274 
Any external outcasting regime that relies on first-party outcasting will 
likely face similar inequities. Larger, more powerful states will find outcasting 
less threatening—particularly if the state threatening to put in place an 
outcasting sanction is smaller, weaker, or more dependent on the outcast state. 
This is problematic from a fairness perspective. It could also prove problematic 
for the legitimacy of a legal regime, and hence its long-term effectiveness. If 
smaller and weaker states find that they always lose, they may be less eager to 
participate in the regime—and they may take opportunities to undercut the 
regime when they can do so without retribution. At the same time, it must be 
remembered that inequality is a basic fact of the international system—one that 
outcasting did not create. Indeed, in some cases, outcasting can serve to 
ameliorate inequity by binding powerful and weak states together in regimes 
that provide mutual benefits of social cooperation and membership to them all. 
3. Outcasting Is Nonviolent 
The most significant limitation of outcasting is its pacifism. Outcasting is 
nonviolent exclusion. The danger, of course, is that the outcast will not heed a 
toothless attempt at exclusion unless physically forced to do so. 
Take the double-hull tanker requirements under the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships—known as 
 
272.  United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
(Current Status Summary), WORLD TRADE ORG. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm. 
273.  U.N. Stat. Div., Antigua and Barbuda, WORLD STATISTICS POCKETBOOK (2011), available at 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Antigua%20and%20Barbuda. 
274.  Antigua spends 0.5% of its GDP on its military. It ranks 161st in the world in its military 
expenditures as a portion of GDP. CIA, Antigua and Barbuda, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ac.html (last updated 
Sept. 27, 2011). 
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“MARPOL.”275 The agreement puts in place extensive equipment requirements 
for tankers. Each ship whose flag state is a party to the Convention is required 
to carry documentation—issued by the flag state of the ship—which certifies 
their compliance with these equipment standards.276 When a ship enters the 
port of a state party, the port state has the right to inspect the ship’s required 
documents as well as the ship itself.277 If the port state “determines that a ship 
can be regarded as substandard”—meaning that its “hull, machinery, 
equipment or operational safety, is substantially below the standards 
required”—it “should immediately ensure that corrective action is taken to 
safeguard the safety of the ship and passengers and/or crew and eliminate any 
threat of harm to the marine environment before permitting the ship to sail.”278 
MARPOL thus requires substandard ships to be denied the right to sail out of 
port, outcasting them from all open waters. 
Suppose a port state does as MARPOL requires and outcasts a substandard 
ship by forbidding it to sail until deficiencies are remediated. It is possible that 
the crew of the ship will heed the order and remain patiently. But it is also 
possible that the crew of the ship will ignore the order and attempt to leave the 
port. The obvious solution is for the port state to threaten to use physical force 
to detain the ship. It might seize the ship, arrest the sailors, and so on. In this 
way, violence may compensate for the pacifism of outcasting. Outcasts that 
refuse to heed exclusion orders are forced to do so. 
 
275.  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, as 
modified by Protocol of 1978, opened for signature Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 62 (entered 
into force Oct. 2, 1983) [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
276.  MARPOL requires each oil tanker of a certain size to carry an International Oil Pollution 
Prevention certificate—issued by the flag state or by a classification society selected by the 
flag state after inspection verifying required equipment was in place. This is only one of 
several documentation requirements under MARPOL, all of which operate in a similar 
fashion. Id., Annex I; RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 172-73 (1994). Ships of nonparties are 
not provided with an IOPP Certificate but are held to the same construction and inspection 
requirements. See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE MARITIME 
SAFETY COMMITTEE ON ITS EIGHTY-NINTH SESSION 5 (2011), available at http://www.uscg.mil/ 
imo/msc/docs/msc-89-add-3.pdf [hereinafter IMO, REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY 
COMMITTEE]. 
277.  IMO, REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE, supra note 276, at 9; see Resolution 
MEPC.117(52), Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Oct. 15, 2004 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/ 
blastDataHelper.asp/data_id%3D15720/117%2852%29.pdf; MITCHELL, supra note 276, at 172. 
278.  IMO, REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE, supra note 276, at 7, 13. 
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Let us call these sorts of schemes “mixed” enforcement regimes. They are 
“mixed” because violence and outcasting are used in tandem. Put in the terms 
we introduced in Section II.A, mixed regimes contain mixed enforcement 
chains. Each chain consists of links of a different character: some links 
authorize outcasting while others authorize physical force. In the case of 
MARPOL, the physical force link follows the outcasting link because violence 
acts as a fail-safe ensuring that the exclusion of outcasting is heeded. 
It is a remarkable feature of outcasting that in many cases the outcast need 
not be threatened with violence at all. Consider the breaking off of diplomatic 
relations by recalling one’s diplomats. This is a case of “pure” outcasting. No 
violence is threatened because the outcast is not required to participate in the 
exclusion. The outcaster can unilaterally withdraw the benefits. Or consider 
Security Council-authorized economic sanctions under the U.N. Charter. 
Member states outcast the scofflaw nation by refusing to engage in economic 
interchange with it. Again, no violence need be threatened against the outcast 
because the sanction takes the form of a boycott—a boycott only requires the 
participation of the outcasting states, not the outcasted one. 
In general, outcasting regimes need not threaten violence against outcasts 
when the benefits of cooperation depend solely on the actions of the outcasters. 
For in such cases, the outcasters can deny such benefits simply by refusing to 
act cooperatively with the outcasts. Outcasting is weaker when the benefits of 
cooperation involve permitting outcasts to act. For in these instances (such as 
MARPOL), withdrawing the benefits by withholding permission will be 
effective only if the outcast respects the decision. If it does not, violence may be 
necessary to ensure that the outcast complies. 
vi.  international law enforcement reimagined 
The picture of international law offered in this Article aims to open up a 
new way of seeing international law and thus cast the central organizing 
questions of the field in a new light. We have shown that the Modern State 
Conception of law reflects only a small slice of what is, in fact, law. It is now 
apparent that the debate over whether international law is or is not law based 
on the Modern State Conception of law is largely beside the point. 
International law need not meet the Modern State Conception’s conditions of 
internality and physical force to be law, for law that is enforced externally 
rather than internally and through outcasting rather than through physical 
force is law, too. 
Here we briefly discuss three central contributions this new understanding 
of international law promises to make. First, we aim to offer a new account of 
international law as law—and thereby show that the “1960s chestnut of a 
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question” is not irrelevant but has simply been considered on the wrong terms. 
Second, we show that this new understanding of international law opens up a 
series of new questions for scholars of international law, allowing them to look 
at the organizing questions of the field through a new lens and thereby 
reimagine the possibilities for international law. Third, and finally, we argue 
that the new picture of international law that we offer here casts the normative 
debate over international law in new light. We aim to turn the sovereigntist 
critique on its head—showing that states that choose not to participate in 
international legal institutions are simply voluntary outcasts. 
A. Examining International Law as Law 
This Article examines and responds to the central critique made by skeptics 
of international law—that international law cannot be law because it does not 
matter in the way law must matter. We show that by engaging this critique 
directly, we can open up logical space that would otherwise not have been 
apparent. In doing so, we are able to make new progress on an issue that is of 
pressing interest to international legal scholars—when and whether 
international law matters. 
Yet our aim in engaging the critique of international law as law is not 
merely instrumental. We aim, as well, to make progress toward answering the 
broader question of whether international law is law. As we stated in the 
Introduction, we do not attempt a full answer to the question here. Doing so 
would require us to first articulate a theory of law, which is far beyond the 
confines of this Article. We have instead sought to make a step toward that 
goal by engaging the central critique of international law and demonstrating 
that it is ill founded. We hope in the process that we have shown that the effort 
to engage the question whether international law is law is not “futile” or 
“tired,” but is fruitful, fresh, and worthy of continued study. 
The stakes of this broader debate are immense. The Modern State 
Conception derives its appeal not only from the fact that all paradigmatic 
instances of law in the modern world have well-developed enforcement 
institutions that employ physical intimidation and coercion. Its appeal is also 
explainable by the fact that the properties which make law law are also those 
properties that make law morally valuable. On the Modern State Conception, 
internal physical enforcement is necessary for a regime to be a legal system 
because what makes regimes worthy of respect—indeed morally indispensable 
in the modern world—is that they can accomplish certain tasks that no other 
comparable social institution can. Namely, they can wield and focus an 
enormous amount of physical force to ensure that people obey their demands. 
In the words of Hans Kelsen, law is “organized force.” Thus, despite the fact 
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that legal officials are almost always a small minority of a population, the 
bureaucratic organization of enforcement personnel harnesses and magnifies 
their power, thereby enabling them to compel obedience to the will of the law. 
In our view, the moral distinctiveness of the law does not derive from its 
ability to use internally controlled physical coercion in order to enforce its will. 
Rather, it stems from the fact that legal systems are extremely sophisticated 
instruments for effecting social change through the creation and application of 
rules. The idea might be expressed as follows: when a community faces moral 
problems that are numerous and serious and that require complex, 
contentious, or arbitrary solutions, certain modes of governance such as 
improvisation, spontaneous ordering, private bargaining, or communal 
consensus will be costly to engage in, sometimes prohibitively so. Unless the 
community has a way of reducing the costs of governance, resolving these 
moral problems will be expensive at best, and impossible at worst. On our 
view, the moral indispensability of the law arises from its ability to meet this 
demand in an efficient manner. By providing a highly nimble and durable 
method for creating and applying rules, the law enables communities to solve 
the numerous and serious problems that would otherwise be too costly or risky 
to resolve.279 
To be sure, law would not be morally indispensable if it were purely 
aspirational in nature. Legal systems not only create and apply rules: they also 
see to it that their demands are met. But as opposed to the Modern State 
Conception, we do not require that legal systems ensure that their will be done 
in any particular fashion. Their methods for motivating compliance are a 
contingent matter. Whether a particular regime deems it appropriate to employ 
physical force depends on the costs and benefits of doing so. Much will depend 
on the material wealth of the society, the current state of technology, the 
legitimacy enjoyed by the regime, the cultural meaning of violence, the climate 
and geography of the territory, the degree of social interdependence and 
cooperation, the availability of external sources of coercion, and so on. Indeed, 
the ability of the law to solve moral problems may in some cases depend on its 
decision to eschew violence as a means of enforcement. As we saw in the case of 
Iceland, the egalitarian ethos of the commonwealth demanded that the law be 
enforced by private individuals. And the Roman Catholic Church took itself to 
be spiritually barred from using temporal sanctions. If it was to do God’s will, 
it would have to turn the other cheek. So, too, the nature of state sovereignty 
demands that international law only apply physical force in rare instances. Like 
Iceland and classical canon law, international law must—and does—rely on 
 
279.  See SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 170-76. 
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another means of law enforcement. And that means, more often than not, is 
externalized outcasting. 
B. Reimagining Possibilities in International Law 
Seeing external enforcement and outcasting as modes of law enforcement 
allows scholars to reimagine the possibilities for international law. Recognizing 
that international law often operates through external enforcement—by calling 
on states to enforce the law—can lead us to see the successes and failures of 
international law in an entirely new light. 
Once we see that international law relies heavily on external enforcement, 
this shifts our attention to how external enforcement works—and when and 
why it does not. Law that relies on external actors for enforcement is vulnerable 
in an obvious way to the independent choices of those external actors. An 
international legal regime might rely on external actors to enforce, but that 
does not mean they will always do so. Attention, therefore, must be paid to 
when, why, and how external actors will act to enforce international legal 
obligations. Seen in this light, the problem of international legal enforcement is 
turned upside down—when an international legal regime that relies on external 
enforcement goes unenforced, it is not a failure of the international institution 
as such, but a failure of states to act. Viewing the problem through this lens, 
then, offers a new agenda for scholars seeking to understand how to make 
international legal regimes more effective. 
At the same time, once we see outcasting as a central mode of international 
law enforcement, we see international law enforcement in an entirely new light. 
International agreements that lack enforcement through physical force do not 
necessarily lack enforcement. Enforcement through exclusion from the benefits 
of social cooperation can be as powerful at motivating states to comply with the 
law as any physical force—and sometimes even more powerful. And not only is 
outcasting powerful, but it is multifaceted. Different forms of outcasting are 
better suited to addressing different sets of challenges. This opens up a new 
world of possibilities for international law—and a host of new questions for 
scholars to answer. Why do some variations exist in some contexts and not in 
others? Are there further variations that could be used to respond to challenges 
not already met by existing forms of outcasting? Are there areas of 
international law where outcasting could be better tailored to effectively 
enforce the law? What barriers exist to making those changes and how might 
they be overcome? We have attempted to begin this conversation, but much 
remains to be done. 
  
the yale law journal  
348 
 
C. The Sovereigntist Fallacy 
The Modern State Conception insists that regimes are legal systems only 
when they enforce their commands internally through the threat and exercise 
of physical force. This vision of law places defenders of international law in an 
indefensible position: if international law is “really” law, then it is like a 
modern state—with international police ready to use violence to force states to 
comply with its commands. To be real law under the Modern State 
Conception, then, international law must live up to the greatest fears of its 
critics—trampling state sovereignty and democratic self-determination. 
We have attempted in this Article to show that this is a false trap. Law 
enforcement that fits the Modern State Conception is one form of law 
enforcement, but it is not the only form. There are other forms of law 
enforcement that violate the conditions of the Modern State Conception—
enforcing commands through external actors, or relying on outcasting rather 
than physical force, or, as in the case of most of international law, both. 
Once we see that international law most often operates not through the 
tools of the Modern State Conception but instead through externalized 
outcasting, we can see that the sovereigntist critique of international law stands 
on a false foundation. By relying on external actors to enforce the law, 
international law places responsibility for the success or failure of law back 
upon the states that created it. It is not the blue-helmeted police of the United 
Nations that enforce the vast majority of international law, but pressures 
brought to bear by other states. Those states act, moreover, not by threatening 
physical force. Rather, they create agreements that produce benefits for all their 
members—and then threaten to exclude those who violate those rules from 
some or all of the benefits of the regime. 
Indeed, the very nature of the international legal system requires that it be 
so. International law, like Icelandic and classical canon law, must rely on some 
means of enforcement other than physical force. International law’s lack of the 
capacities of a modern state is a feature, not a bug, of international law. Yes, 
international law is not enforced by an international police force—and that is 
exactly as it must be. Just as the presence of a king with the power to physically 
force compliance with the law would have been inconsistent with the 
egalitarianism of medieval Iceland and temporal sanctions administered by the 
Church of the classical period would have sullied the Church’s spiritual 
character; so too would the existence of international police exerting physical 
power to force states to comply be inconsistent with the very meaning of 
international law, which is based on respect for the sovereignty and self-
determination of states. 
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It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of state sovereignty in 
international law. The international legal system is both created by and creates 
sovereign states. A treaty, for example, is “an international agreement 
concluded between States.”280 Similarly, customary international law results 
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation. At the same time, the very idea of what it is to be a “state” is, 
in a very real sense, a legal construction—one based on physical facts, to be 
sure—but nonetheless constructed through shared understandings. Perhaps 
the most important of these shared understandings is that the quintessential 
defining characteristic of a “state” is its monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force within its geographical boundaries. International law thus creates, 
protects, and reinforces state sovereignty through various legal rules including 
the obligation not to use aggressive physical force against another sovereign 
state except in rare circumstances. International law cannot primarily rely on 
internal physical force against states as a means of law enforcement, because to 
do so would threaten to collapse the very idea of what it is to be a “state” and 
thus eliminate the precondition for the existence of international law in the 
cause of enforcing it. 
The recognition that international law most often relies on outcasting 
rather than physical force turns the sovereigntist critique on its head. If 
international legal regimes are best understood as arrangements that generate 
community benefits for member states and impose discipline through 
outcasting (excluding lawbreakers from the benefits of membership), then 
international law does not have the power to rob states of their sovereignty. 
Instead, it only has the power to take away the very benefits that it has itself 
generated. If that is true, then states that refuse to join international 
agreements out of a fear that doing so will undermine their sovereignty are 
simply voluntary outcasts. 
 
280.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 225, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
